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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Recent changes made by the Australian Government have highlighted the negative 
consequences of policy instability on the renewable energy sector. Yet, this problem is rarely 
explored in literature, and limited management tools are available to assist industry in 
mitigating the consequences. The traditional approach to this issue, focuses on governments as 
both the root cause, and only solution. This paper considers a more lateral approach, evaluating 
the implications of policy instability in Australia from an industry perspective, in order to 
propose a more strategic set of management responses.  
Bloomberg New Energy Finance [3] found that investment in large-scale renewable energy 
projects dropped 88% from 2013 to 2014, due to “uncertainty in the Renewable Energy Target”, 
which caused a severe downturn in asset financing.  This lack of uptake, and minimal level of 
investment, had not been seen since 2002, when Australia’s Renewable Energy Target was 2%. 
Despite these significant consequences there is limited literature which examines the effects in 
commensurate detail. Thus the objectives of this investigation are to: identify aspects of policy 
instability causing detriment to engineering projects within the Solar Photovoltaic, 
Concentrating Solar Power, and Wind Power industries; analyse the extent of resultant losses; 
and propose management strategies which could minimise negative implications. 
In order to analyse such a large issue, five key sources of policy instability were identified: 
‘Excessive Policy Change’, ‘Policy Design’ ‘Jurisdictional Interactions’, ‘Policy Reviews’, and 
the Governments ‘Long-term Strategic Outlook’. An analysis of Australian policy in respect to 
these sources, found no single root cause of policy instability - rather that which caused the 
most detriment varied both by industry, by type, as well as with time. 
In order to develop management strategies, an international analysis of energy resource 
utilisation was conducted to identify nations which had overcome the negative implications of 
policy instability. This analysis yielded Germany and Spain for further investigation on a case 
study basis. Given the wide ranging nature of the issue, no ‘one-size fits all’ solution was found, 
rather, a range of strategies is proposed in order for stakeholders to mitigate negative outcomes. 
The proposed strategies validate the merit of considering a ‘government policy problem’ from 
an industry perspective, though further research is required to develop and advance them. It is 
hoped these strategies will assist the renewable energy industry, in providing a solution driven 
approach that can be implemented by those that require it. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Due to recent changes made by the Australia Government, policy instability has become the 
most frequently cited barrier to the uptake of renewable energy (RE) in Australia. Relative to 
traditional energy sources, the renewables sector is somewhat of a fledgling industry in 
Australia, that is dependent on stable government policies in order to attract investors. The 
sector is uniquely susceptible, not only to policies which target specific industry development, 
but also those which target emissions reductions. This became evident soon after the 2013 
federal election returned a change of government, and with it a shifting agenda in policy 
direction.   
Aside from policy instability, there are several lesser barriers to the uptake of renewable energy 
in Australia.  This includes such factors as the intermittent nature of both wind and solar power, 
as well as issues with existing grid infrastructure. Yet, a review of scientific literature, 
government reports and industry documents extending beyond the last decade, found policy 
instability, to be the most significant and frequently cited barrier. Thus highlighting a great 
disparity in scientific literature, whereby this key barrier is generally only briefly mentioned 
and rarely explored further. The limited literature which does explore the issue further, is 
focused on identifying the consequences of policy instability, without providing solutions, e.g. 
[9-11]. While the few papers which propose solutions, do so by considering policy design only.  
As a result, there is essentially no literature available as a management tool, for the purpose of 
assisting industry in managing the consequences of policy instability. This was noted by White 
et al. [9] who “found little research on how firms should prepare themselves for policy 
changes”.  
It is a matter of concern that industry itself does not appear to be making any progress in this 
respect either. From over a decade of industry documentation, only one developer [12] 
mentioned taking any steps in managing the problem. Certainly, this does draw on a 
representative sample, and one cannot conclusively rule out the existence of management tools 
simply on the basis that they are not discussed. However, industry rhetoric has changed little 
over the last decade, reflecting the current literature. Whereby the overwhelming number of 
industry comments on the issue, simply identify the government as both the cause and the only 
solution. While it is true the most obvious solution would be for the government to change its 
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behaviour, history shows such an outcome to be unlikely. Indeed, as the negative consequences 
of policy instability become more widely publicised, the disparity in the actions of many 
governments also becomes evident. This has been noted in literature, with Alonso, Hewitt [13] 
going as far as making the following statement in respect to Spanish policy makers:  
The stable legislative conditions and the careful handling of investor confidence are 
frequently cited reasons for the success of Renewable energy development in Spain. 
This is so widely known that it seems plausible that policy makers have deliberately 
crashed the system.  
1.2 Approach 
This paper proposes a more lateral approach to the given problem. To date, policy instability 
has been defined as a problem caused by government, to be solved by government. In this paper 
we approach the same problem, assuming that it cannot be solved by Government, and consider 
it the responsibility of industry to mitigate the consequences. Such an approach is intrinsically 
complex for industry to drive and control - and this paper does not propose to find the solution. 
Rather its purpose is to verify the merits of this direction and set in motion a solution that 
focuses on implementation by the industry that requires it. 
The importance of investigating this issue and approaching it from a different perspective, is 
highlighted by considering three key points. Firstly, policy instability has been recognised as a 
key barrier to the uptake of Renewable energy in Australia, secondly, there are limited 
management strategies available to industry, and finally there is limited literature which focuses 
on the problem. Thus, the aims of this paper follow: 
1. Identify aspects of policy instability causing detriment to engineering projects within 
the Solar Photovoltaic, Concentrating Solar Power, and Wind Power industries. 
2. Analyse the extent of resultant losses for industry. 
3. Propose management strategies for industry which could minimise negative 
implications. 
Investigating this issue, could have potentially unlimited scope, thus we focus on electricity 
generation, from Wind Power, Solar Photovoltaic (PV) and Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) 
in Australia only. This focus is in consideration of the significant greenhouse gas emissions 
from electricity generation, and in light of the nation’s requirements to meet emission 
reductions targets. Whilst the focus on wind and solar PV, is founded on a basis of rapid growth 
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in these industries over the last decade. Conversely, the focus on CSP provides a balanced 
perspective, as it is a nascent industry which has the potential to provide baseload power. 
1.3 Methodology 
A methodology was designed with the objective of approaching the problem laterally, given 
two key flaws in the current methodology. 
1. Linear Causality. 
Current literature tends toward a methodology based on a linear relationship of cause and effect. 
Typically utilising an IMRaD (Introduction, Methods, Results, and Discussion) structure, 
aspects of one policy (cause) and the corresponding consequences (effect) of instability are 
examined. For example, Jotzo, Jordan [10] and Simpson and Clifton [11] both provide a 
detailed analysis of policy instability by considering the Renewable energy Target and Carbon 
Price respectively. While this approach provides a useful analysis, it fails to consider the 
complex nature of policy instability. Whereby, an environment of policy instability is driven by 
multiple factors. The factors themselves may be harmless on their own, yet it is their 
combination that drives policy instability. Consider this as the difference between ‘change’ and 
‘excessive change’. This approach also gives rise to the second flaw. 
2. Policy Design Perspective. 
Policy instability is rightly considered a policy problem. Yet, considering the issue from a 
policy perspective, ultimately leads only to policy based solutions. For example, though Jotzo, 
Jordan [10] provided a concise analysis of instability, the paper’s final conclusion was that, 
“there is no realistic solution in sight, short of re-establishing a durable, bipartisan political 
agreement”. While this approach provides the Government with the tools required to attain 
policy stability, it also assumes the Government has a desire and/or capability to implement the 
recommended measures. History has shown this is not always the case.  
Research which does consider the multiple drivers of policy instability, generally does so with 
the purpose of determining the stability of one instrument over another. Yet, what benefit is this 
to industry, if the government has implemented the latter?  
The aforementioned flaws highlight the underlying issue, that current research methodologies 
are of somewhat limited use to the very industry which is affected by the consequences. In light 
of this, a methodology was designed, that not only attempted to consider the multiple drivers 
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of instability, but also approached the problem assuming that Government will continue to drive 
instability, and industry must identify how to manage an ongoing problem. 
Consequently, this paper is a union of three parts. Part One provides contextual information 
including, electricity generation, the Australian system of Government and renewable energy 
policy. Part Two provides background information and analyses issues surrounding policy 
instability in Australia. In Part Three we discuss potential management response strategies. This 
is achieved via an international analysis of energy resource utilisation to identify nations with 
established management strategies, that are then considered in the context of Australia.  
Part One: 
 Section 2 – Details the structure of governance and electricity generation in Australia. 
Also considers how the organisation of these structures has contributed to the issues at 
hand. 
 Section 3 – Briefly introduces the renewable energy policies which affect stakeholders. 
This includes a discussion on the complexities that arise between direct and indirect 
policies, and those that are multi-targeted. Five key sources of policy instability are then 
identified, for consideration in the proceeding sections. 
Part Two: 
 Section 4 –  Investigates the triggers and consequences of policy instability in Australia. 
This section is comprised of several ‘case studies’. Each ‘case study’ represents a factor 
that contributes to an environment of policy instability, and is structured to first provide 
background information, then a detailed analysis. 
 Section 5 – Analyses two generic consequences of policy instability, specifically 
employment and investment. 
Part Three: 
 Section 6 – International analysis of energy resource utilisation, identifies two nations 
for further investigation on a case study basis. 
 Section 7 – Drawing on the information from the proceeding chapters, possible 
management strategies are proposed.  
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2 ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN AUSTRALIA 
Prior to analysing specific aspects of policy instability, the electricity sector and Australian 
system of government are considered, with a particular focus on how their structure has 
contributed to policy instability. 
2.1 Overview of Electricity Generation in Australia 
Australia has a population of over 24 million people and is the sixth largest country in the world 
in terms of land area which equates to 7.692 million km2 [14]. The vast majority of the continent 
is sparsely inhabited with the key population areas spread along the eastern coastline, as 
depicted in Figure 2.1. The large distances between population centres pose a unique challenge 
for electricity distribution and transmission, giving rise to the world’s longest interconnected 
power system along the eastern coastline.  
  
Figure 2.1: Australian Population Density Map [15] 
Australia has an abundance of diverse natural resources and is the world’s ninth-largest energy 
producer [16]. It is also heavily dependent upon coal and natural gas which accounted for 83% 
of electricity generation in 2013-2014, as well as 17% of the nation’s goods and services exports 
in 2014. Particularly the economic reliance on fossil fuels, has proved a hindrance to the uptake 
of renewable energy in recent years. Nonetheless, electricity generation from renewable energy 
sources is growing, representing almost 15% of generation in 2013-2014. Australian electricity 
generation by fuel type in 2013-2014 is shown in Figure 2.2, and Table 2.1 details the growth 
in each sector. 
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Table 2.1: Australian Electricity Generation by Fuel Type [17] 
 
2013-2014 Average Annual Growth 
Total Generation 
(GWh) 
Share (%) 2013-14 (%) 10 year (%) 
Oil products 5,012 2.0 12.3 6.5 
Black coal 105,772 42.6 -5.1 -2.1 
Brown coal 46,076 18.6 -3.1 -1.6 
Natural gas 54,394 21.9 6.5 9.6 
Fossil Fuel Total 211,255 85.1 -2.4 0.2 
Bioenergy 3,511 1.4 11.4 -1 
Hydropower 18,421 7.4 0.8 1.9 
Wind 10,252 4.1 28.8 21.3 
Solar PV 4,858 2.0 27 58.3 
Geothermal 0.5 0.0 0 0 
Renewables Total 37,042 14.9 11.6 6.8 
TOTAL 248,297 100.0 -0.6 0.9 
 
Figure 2.2: Australian Electricity Generation by Fuel Type 2013-2014 [17] 
The use of Wind and Solar PV for electricity generation in Australia, has grown an average 
21% and 58% respectively in the ten-year period to 2014.  As shown in Figure 2.3, Solar PV 
has experienced significant growth more recently (since 2009), compared with the uptake of 
wind, which has been steady and ongoing since 2000. Although the Levelised Cost of 
Electricity varies by State in Australia, these technologies are generally on par with traditional 
fossil fuelled generation. 
Black coal
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Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) is still in the development phase, and contributed 4 GWh for 
electricity generation in 2014. This is primarily due to high technology costs in comparison to 
other forms of renewable energy.  
 
Figure 2.3: Australian Wind and Solar PV Electricity Generation 
2.2 Australian System of Government 
In order to contextualise the influence of the Australian Government on the electricity sector, 
the overarching system of governance is now briefly presented. 
The Commonwealth of Australia is both a representative democracy and a constitutional 
monarchy with Queen Elizabeth II as Australia's Head of State, and the Prime Minister Malcolm 
Turnbull as the current Head of Government [18]. There are three levels of government; federal, 
state/territory and local government. Table 2.2 lists the Australian prime ministers from 1994 
to date, where it can be seen that after almost 12 years served by John Howard, Australia entered 
a period of variability. From 2010-2015 there were five serving Prime Ministers, of whom only 
three were elected. Although unelected changes in Prime Minister are historically common, 
there have been only two other instances where three consecutive periods of parliament have 
had more than one Prime Minister. Furthermore, the calendar year 2013 was overseen by three 
distinct prime ministers. This has occurred only four other times, all prior to 1946, with two of 
these instances occurring due to death [19]. These historical comparisons highlight the 
environment of political instability of the past few years. 
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Although Australian Prime Ministers do not have a restricted time in office, and terms have 
varied historically from 7 days to 18 years, only about half were in office for a total time of 
more than three years [19]. The short-term nature of Australian politics can be challenging for 
projects which require long-term financial and regulatory stability over many years. 
Table 2.2: Australian Prime Ministers from 1996 to 2016 
Period of Parliament/ 
Election Year 
Prime Minister Political Party Years in Office 
38th - 41st  
1996, 1998, 2001, 2004 
John Howard Liberal Coalition 1996 - 2007 
42nd 2007 
Kevin Rudd (1st) Labor 2007 - 2010 
Julia Gillard Labor 
2010 - 2013 
43rd 2010 
Julia Gillard Labor 
Kevin Rudd (2nd) Labor 2013 
44th 2013 
Tony Abbott Liberal Coalition 2013 - 2015 
Malcolm Turnbull Liberal Coalition 
2015 - current 
45th 2016 Malcolm Turnbull Liberal Coalition 
2.2.1 Federal Level of Government 
Section 51 of the Constitution outlines the responsibility of the Federal Government. Examples 
include foreign relations, trade, defence and immigration. On a federal level, there are three 
separate arms of government: 
1. The legislative arm (Australian Parliament) debates and votes on laws under the power 
of Section 51 in the Constitution, which apply to the entire nation. Australia has a 
bicameral parliament in that it consists of two houses, the House of Representatives 
(150 members, full-preference preferential voting) and the Senate (76 members, 
proportional representation preferential voting).   
2. The executive arm (Australian Government) enacts and upholds the laws passed by 
parliament. Some members of Parliament also have executive powers. 
3. The legal arm (judiciary) is independent of the other two arms, as it is responsible for 
their monitoring in addition to law enforcement [18]. 
Australia essentially operates on a two-party system consisting of the Australian Labor Party 
(ALP) (current opposition) and the Liberal/National Party Coalition (current government). 
Government is formed after an election by the party (or coalition of parties) with the majority 
of seats in the House of Representatives. For a bill to become a law it must first pass the House 
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of Representatives (the lower house) and then the Senate (the upper house) after which it is 
signed by the Governor-General and thus becomes an Act of Parliament.  
Given the two-party system, bi-partisan policy support has significant implications for policy 
stability. As the resident party/coalition in government generally has the majority in the lower 
house, they can (in theory) ensure their legislation passes the lower house, assuming all 
members vote along party lines, regardless of bi-partisan support. However, significant power 
is vested in the senate due to their capacity to block government legislation. It is rare for the 
government to have a majority in the senate, and this has only occurred a handful of times since 
1949. As a result, the enactment of legislation that does not have bi-partisan policy support 
generally depends on ‘deals’ with independent senators or smaller parties.  Alternatively, 
legislation may be negotiated and altered until bi-partisan support is present, or dropped 
completely if sufficient support is not present.  
Figure 2.4 shows the senate composition of the current 45th Parliament, which is comprised of 
20 cross-bench senators. This is the highest number of cross benchers on record since the 44th 
parliament, which had 18 senators superseding the previous record of 13 cross-bench senators 
in 2002-2005. The enactment of legislation which depends upon ‘deals’ and ‘agreements’ with 
a small number of senators is significantly less predictable than a policy with bi-partisan 
support. Thus, when an existing policy loses bi-partisan support, it essentially loses guaranteed 
enactment and becomes dependent upon (often) unpredictable agreements. 
 
Figure 2.4: Senate Composition of the 45th Parliament [20] 
2.2.2 State/Territory Level of Government 
Utilities including those that supply electricity, are not defined by Section 51 of the Constitution 
and are thus the responsibility of the Australian States and Territories. State governments have 
their own separate constitutions in addition to different legislative, executive and judiciary 
structures. Territories are areas not claimed by the states and can be self-governed or 
administered by the federal government [18]. State/territory governments can also pass on 
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matters to the federal government, and in some areas including for example renewable energy 
targets, state and federal parliament can both enact laws.  However, section 109 of the 
Australian Constitution states that in the case of conflicting laws, federal law overrides state 
law. The combination of state and federal legislative involvement in the energy sector in 
Australia has created many multi-jurisdictional issues for industry, and has been a trigger for 
policy instability.  
2.2.3 Local Level of Government 
The constitutional responsibilities of local government differ nationally as they are decided on 
at state/territory level [18].  This inconsistency results in further stakeholder complexity. For 
example, a project in one state may involve only state and federal government as stakeholders, 
whilst the identical project in a different state could involve state, federal and local government 
as stakeholders. Furthermore, the makeup of local government jurisdictions also varies. For 
example, the Perth metropolitan area essentially has a different local council for each suburb, 
while the whole Brisbane metropolitan area has only one council. As a result, Brisbane City 
Council has jurisdiction in an area covering 1,367 km2 and a population of approximately 1.15 
million people, while Perth City Council covers an area of 8 km2 and population of 
approximately 20,000 people [21, 22]. As a result, local government involvement in a project 
can potentially vary from one to multiple stakeholders. Although federal and state governments 
generally play a greater role in legislative project requirements, local government support is 
closely linked with community support, and is thus a key consideration for site selection. Solar 
Farm developer Fotowatio Renewable Ventures [23] recommended to “select localities 
supportive of development determined through early engagement with local government”. 
2.2.4 Governance of Energy Generation 
The governance of energy generation in Australia is based on a mixture of state, territory and 
federal responsibilities, international agreements, intergovernmental arrangements, and market 
governance agreements [24].  The latter two are primarily organised through The Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) and the Ministerial Council of Energy which comprises 
federal, state and territory energy ministers. 
The combination of governance at different levels has resulted in a complex jurisdictional 
arrangement that is challenging to manoeuvre. As a result, many of the decisions in the energy 
sector have been made through COAG, including the establishment of the National Electricity 
Market and modifications to the renewable energy target. A cohesive national approach to 
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energy policy is of significant importance to achieving a more stable policy environment, and 
COAG is one of the key forums for state ministers to collaborate and achieve these outcomes.  
2.3 Australia’s Electricity Grid and Market 
Australia has two major electricity markets, the National Electricity Market (NEM) and the 
South West Interconnected System (SWIS), as well as large numbers of ‘off grid’ or ‘non-
market’ installations [24].  Numerous small isolated networks service remote communities, 
predominantly in Western Australia and the Northern Territory [24].  The Australian electricity 
system is comprised of four key components, as depicted in Figure 2.5. 
 
Figure 2.5: The Electricity System [25] 
2.3.1 National Electricity Market 
The NEM interconnect network stretches approximately 5000 km across all states except 
Western Australia and the Northern Territory. It serves approximately 92% of Australia’s 
electricity load and has around 88% of the country’s generation capacity [24]. Table 2.3 
provides a quick overview of the NEM.  
Table 2.3: National Electricity Market at a Glance [26] 
Installed Capacity 47, 641 MW 
Number of Registered Generators 336 
Number of Customers 9.8 million 
NEM Turnover 2014-15 $8.2 billion 
Total Energy Generated 2014-15 194 TWh 
Maximum Winter Demand 2014-15 30, 201 MW 
Maximum Summer Demand 2014-15 29, 472 MW 
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2.3.2 Non-NEM Electricity Grids and Markets 
In Western Australia, the southern SWIS network and smaller North West Interconnected 
System (NWIS) are connected by gas pipelines only. Both networks are operated by different 
state utilities, and generation asset ownership is a mixture of state and private. Electricity from 
the NWIS is sold directly by the state owned utility operator and due to its small size is not 
expected to move to a market system. Electricity from the SWIS is sold through the wholesale 
electricity market. 
A small electricity industry is present in the Northern Territory which consists of three separate 
regulated systems. These have all previously operated on bilateral agreements between 
government and private generators and retailers, however in 2015, “the Territory began moving 
towards consistency with the NEM’s regulatory framework” [27] introducing an interim 
Electricity Market with plans to transition to a wholesale electricity market [27]. 
Figure 2.6 depicts both the NEM and non-NEM networks.  
 
Figure 2.6: Australian Electricity Transmission System [16] 
2.3.3 Key Power Generation Institutions and Legislation 
Under the Australian constitution, state/territory governments are responsible for resources 
onshore and within 3 nautical miles from the baseline of the territorial sea. Resources beyond 
this are the responsibility of the federal government [24]. As a result, almost all energy related 
legislation and regulation is enacted and enforced on a state level. The advantages of a more 
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cohesive system were recognised in 1991 when the COAG commenced, and led energy market 
reforms resulting in the implementation of a national intergovernmental legislative and 
regulatory framework for Australia’s energy markets, “The Australia Energy Market 
Agreement” [28]. In line with these changes, was the gradual addition of the Queensland and 
Tasmanian systems to the already interconnected systems of SA, NSW, ACT and Victoria. The 
key legislation and institutions are described in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 respectively. 
Table 2.4: Australian Energy Market Key Legislation [29] 
Act Schedule Function Subordinate Legislation 
National Electricity 
(South Australia) 
Act 1996 
National 
Electricity 
Law 
Establishes obligations in the 
National Electricity Market and 
for electricity networks. 
National Electricity 
Rules National 
Electricity (SA) 
Regulations 
National Energy 
Retail Law (South 
Australia) Act 2011  
National 
Energy Retail 
Law 
Regulates the supply and sale 
of energy to retail customers. 
National energy Retail 
Rules 
National Energy Retail 
Regulations 
National Gas (South 
Australia) Act 2008 
National Gas 
Law 
Establishes obligations for gas 
pipelines, gas wholesale 
markets and a gas market 
bulletin board. 
National Gas Rules 
National Gas (SA) 
Regulations 
 
Table 2.5: Australian Energy Market Institutions [29] 
Institution Core Responsibilities Structure 
Australian Energy 
Market 
Commission 
(AEMC) 
Rulemaking and energy market 
development at a national level.  
Advising the Ministerial Council 
of Energy upon request. 
Independent national body responsible to 
the COAG. 
Australian Energy 
Market Regulator 
(AER) 
Economic regulation and rule 
enforcement. Regulates 
wholesale and retail energy 
markets, and energy networks. 
 
Independent statutory authority, staff and 
resources provided by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission. 
The Independent Board comprises of one 
Commonwealth member and two 
state/territory members.  
Australian Energy 
Market Operator 
(AEMO) 
Electricity Market Power System 
and Market Operator, Gas 
Markets Operator, National 
Transmission Planner, 
Transmission Services, Energy 
Market Development. 
Body Corporate with 
Government/Industry (60/40) control. 
 
The ‘national’ title of this legislation is rather misleading as numerous exclusions apply. For 
instance, the non-NEM jurisdictions of Western Australia and the Northern Territory, have not 
applied the National Electricity Act or the National Energy Retail Law Act, and amendments 
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are applicable to the National Gas Act. The AEMC can exercise their functions and powers as 
per the agreement in all states; however, they have limited legislative functions both in Western 
Australia (natural gas access only), and the Northern Territory (natural gas only). The AER can 
exercise their functions and powers as per the agreement in all states except Western Australia; 
however they have no legislative functions in Western Australia or the Northern Territory [29, 
30]. The AEMO operates nationally, except in the Northern Territory [31]. As per these 
exclusions, Western Australia and the Northern Territory have separate state legislation, 
regulators and operators where applicable. The regulatory environment of the NEM is described 
in Figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7: Regulatory Environment of Australia's National Electricity Market [28] 
The above exclusions highlight the difficulty in navigating the differing legislation between 
states.  In terms of policy instability, the streamlining of the Australian electricity sector which 
has occurred since 1991 has reduced some regulatory complexity. Any risk associated with 
policy instability of the legislation and institutions outlined in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 is similar 
in all states/territories except Western Australia and the Northern Territory, and thus 
particularly more manageable for company stakeholders operating across these jurisdictions. 
Furthermore, issues of instability arising from indirect jurisdictional actions and the 
identification of sources of instability, are also reduced in a more streamlined environment. It 
is also important to note that the COAG were identified as the primary leaders of this 
streamlining process. 
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2.3.4 Electricity Market Policy Instability 
The lack of a ‘national’ component of the NEM is an ongoing contributor to policy instability 
for the RE sector. Indeed, the national regulator describes the system as “five state-based 
networks and six cross-border interconnectors” [26]. Not only does the retail and wholesale 
electricity price vary by state, but the ownership of generators, interconnectors, and network 
infrastructure (transmission and distribution) also varies, as outlined in Table 2.6. 
Table 2.6: Majority Ownership of Electricity Market Components 
 Generation Capacity Transmission Distribution Retail 
Queensland State State State Private 
New South Wales Private Private Public Private 
Victoria Private Private Private Private 
South Australia Private Private Private (leased) Private 
Tasmania State State State State 
Western Australia State State State State 
Northern Territory State State State State 
The state based nature of the network structure and ownership, results in politicised decision 
making, and hence susceptibility to instability. This was described in the 2013 Productivity 
Commission Report [25]; “Governments may make decisions to reduce dividends when price 
increases are politically sensitive, limit capital spending when governments are concerned 
about debt levels, or encourage capital expenditure if there are pressures for greater reliability”. 
Due to the intermittent nature of RE, times of favourable weather often result in generation 
oversupply. In 2014-2015 wind power that exceeded regional demand in South Australia was 
often exported to Victoria. The low thermal capacity and small number of interconnectors thus 
play a significant role in the integration of RE into the electricity grid. In addition to network 
wide benefits including improved grid efficiency, ‘inter-state electricity transport’ has three 
main benefits specific to RE: 
 An increased scope of geographical locations for RE plants with better grid access. 
 Negative local impacts from intermittent resources are diluted over a larger network. 
 A greater sharing of generation reserves, and increased generator competition. 
Conflicting state priorities have proved a significant hindrance to realising these benefits.  
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Firstly, each state/territory has different generation capacities by fuel type. As shown in Figure 
2.8, NSW has the largest generation capacity followed by Queensland and Victoria.  
Queensland and NSW are predominantly black coal based, while Victoria utilises brown Coal, 
and Tasmania is reliant on hydropower. Wind power also represents a significant portion of 
SA’s generation capacity. Due to price variances by fuel type there is often a reluctance to open 
a ‘closed’ market to a cheaper fuel source. For example, brown coal generators in Victoria 
opposed an upgrade to the Heywood connector between Victoria and South Australia, which 
would potentially increase cheaper wind imports reducing the wholesale spot price.  
 
Figure 2.8: Generation Capacity, by Region and Fuel Source [26] 
Secondly, some states prioritise their own generation with requirements and/or incentives to 
procure electricity locally [25]. This is exacerbated by current State based transmission 
planning which lacks a national focus, as noted in the 2013 productivity report [25] which stated 
that, “state based transmission planning regimes currently give insufficient attention to the 
impacts of their decisions on the effectiveness of transmission systems in other states and on 
the interconnectors themselves”. 
This is particularly detrimental, as interstate transfer capability is not only dependent on the 
thermal capacity of the interconnector, but also on the supporting state transmission systems. 
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3 RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY AND STABILITY 
Prior to analysing specific aspects of policy instability, it is necessary to first outline key 
stakeholders, and provide a brief description of the policies that will be examined. Furthermore, 
key sources of policy instability are identified to underpin the consequent analysis.   
3.1 Stakeholder Identification 
Identifying key stakeholders is paramount to any renewable energy project. In this context five 
major stakeholders influencing policy and projects have been identified as outlined in Table 
3.1.  It should be noted this is a basic outline serving to provide context and define stakeholder 
scope. 
Table 3.1: Key Stakeholders 
Stakeholders Involvement Influence 
General Public 
 
 Potential and past project 
employees 
 Landowners 
 Electricity consumers 
 Vote on Government 
(Democracy) 
 Influenced by NGO’s 
/government/media 
Government 
 
 Make policy decisions 
 Oversee regulation 
 May provide 
grants/loans/subsidies/incentives/ 
etc. 
 Selected by the general public 
 Influenced by public opinion, 
the media and lobbyists 
 Government decisions/actions 
can influence all stakeholders 
Nongovernmental 
Organisatons 
(NGO) 
 Campaign for/against projects  Can sway public opinion 
Renewable Energy 
Industry1 
 
 Manage Projects 
 Generate electricity 
 Compete with Fossil Fuel 
Industry 
 Can influence all stakeholders 
 Are subject to government 
policy and regulation 
 Can be reliant on investor 
involvement 
Fossil Fuel Industry  Competes with Renewable 
Energy Industry 
 Generate electricity 
Energy- Intensive 
Manufacturing 
Industry 
 Neutral in terms of energy 
source 
 Large electricity consumers 
                                                 
1 Note that hereafter, ‘industry’ refers to the ‘Renewable Energy Industry’ unless otherwise 
specified. 
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Stakeholders Involvement Influence 
Investors 
 
 Provide finance for projects 
 Includes anyone with a financial 
interest (eg. Bank, shareholders) 
 Influence industry 
 Are influenced by government 
decisions/actions 
Media  Provide information to the 
general public 
 Can sway public opinion 
3.2 Renewable Energy Policy 
After establishing the main stakeholders, it is vital to briefly introduce the policies which affect 
them. The renewable energy sector is unique, in that is impacted by both direct policies which 
target the development of the sector itself, and indirect policies which target varying aspects of 
climate change. The policies which specifically target renewable energy technology can be 
divided into five separate categories; Fiscal Incentives, Public Finance, Regulatory Instruments, 
Access Policies and Accompanying Measures. Key instruments in each category are briefly 
outlined in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Renewable Energy Technology Policy [32] 
Fiscal Incentives 
Grants and Rebates Monetary assistance provided by the government that does not 
have to be repaid. Could be assistance for a specific purpose to 
eligible parties (grants) or a return portion of the original purchase 
price to the purchasing party (rebate). Both policies aim to reduce 
costs associated with RE system investment/infrastructure/etc. 
Energy Production Payment A direct payment made by the government per unit of RE 
produced. 
Tax exemptions/reductions The government provides tax exemptions/reductions for RE 
sales/production/purchase etc. 
Tax credits Allows investment in RE to be used as a tax deduction. 
Public Finance 
Public Procurement  Public entities purchase RE equipment or services. 
Loans Public loans for the RE Industry generally at low interest rates. 
Public Investment Public investment in RE projects or services. 
Guarantee Risk-sharing mechanism designed to increase domestic lending 
from commercial banks for the RE industry and projects that have 
high perceived credit risk. 
  Regulatory Instruments 
Quantity-
driven 
 
 
 
Renewable 
Portfolio 
Standard/ Quota 
obligation or 
mandate 
Obligates designated parties to meet minimum RE targets, often as 
either a percentage/specified amount of generation or installed 
capacity. Building mandates that require installation of RE 
technology etc. 
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Quantity-
driven 
Tendering/Bidding 
Government authorities organise bidding for a certain quota of RE 
supply capacities or supplies, and then awards the winning bids at 
prices generally above normal market levels. 
Price- 
driven 
Feed-in- Tariffs 
A rate paid to electricity producers for excess electricity generated 
from RE sources that is fed back into the grid. 
Quality- 
driven 
Green energy 
Purchasing 
Regulates the supply of voluntary RE purchases made by 
consumers. 
Green labelling 
Government funded labelling which specifies products that meet 
certain sustainability criteria. Used to facilitate voluntary green 
energy purchasing. 
Access Policies 
Net metering Two-way electricity flow between the electricity grid and 
customers with their own generation. 
Guaranteed or priority 
network access 
Gives RE generated electricity guarantees, or priority access to 
established electricity networks. 
Priority Dispatch Requires preference be given to supplies from RE sources. 
Accompanying Measures 
Voluntary Agreements Similar to the Quality-driven instruments, but not compulsory, for 
example, optional green labelling.  
Education Government funding for renewable energy education or mandated 
content in schools/universities. 
Research and Development Government funding in RE research and development. 
Then there are also the policies which target climate change and indirectly impact on the RE 
sector.  These indirect policies often give rise to numerous complexities. Only some climate 
change policies, or specific parts of a policy will have an indirect effect, and it is often difficult 
to identify which do. Furthermore, as the policy is not specifically targeted at RE technology it 
is often difficult to gauge the extent of these indirect effects, and the implications of instability 
issues such as excessive change. Examples of climate change policies which can have an 
indirect effect on RE projects include: 
 International Treaties 
o Kyoto Protocol 
o United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
 Regulatory Instruments 
o Environmental Standards 
o Technology-based Standards 
 Price on Carbon 
o Price control (eg. Carbon tax) 
o Quantity control (eg. Emissions Trading Scheme) 
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 Direct Action 
o Funds directed to carbon abatement projects through a variety of instruments 
e.g. bidding, rewards, credits etc.  
Some policies have multiple objectives aiming to increase RE deployment and reduce the 
impact of climate change. In these cases, prospective companies are faced with determining 
which target is the policy priority, if indeed there even is a priority, and how a change to that 
policy may affect them. It is also important to consider how investors and other non-government 
stakeholders view the extent of indirect effects.  If these stakeholders consider the indirect 
effects to be significant, a firm can potentially be subjected to unexpected consequences from 
instability, regardless of whether the policy change was exclusively or multi targeted at climate 
change.  
3.3 Renewable Energy Policy Instability 
Although the key RE policies have been introduced, it important to highlight that the purpose 
of this investigation is not to design energy policy or analyse its effectiveness, rather the aim is 
to scrutinise the specific issue of ‘policy instability’.  The general implications and definitions 
of policy stability can vary by sector, making it vital to define the aspects which are important 
to the RE sector. To ensure clarity, these sources will be outlined under five separate headings. 
1. Excessive Policy Change 
Excessive policy change is a key component of policy instability and a dominant causation of 
mistrust and loss of confidence. Mallon [33] persuasively compared the cause and effect of how 
individuals react to “an associate who keeps breaking commitments or changing arrangements”. 
To ensure clarity, three fundamental aspects of policy change have been identified. 
i. Policy Amendments 
Policy amendments can have a varying impact depending on the nature and frequency of the 
amendment/s.  A minor amendment might be the change to a reporting protocol, while 
something more significant might be the alteration of a Feed-in Tariff (FiT), potentially 
affecting everything from the financial viability of a project to the viability of a business itself.  
Furthermore, as the frequency of amendments increases, so does the perception and likelihood 
that further changes will become the norm.  
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ii. Policy Enactment and/or Abolishment 
The enactment or abolishment of a policy is often a precursor of extreme sudden change, the 
significance of which varies with stakeholder dependence and involvement. 
iii. Administrative Changes 
Administrative changes broadly refer to changes in administrative procedures. This can include 
changes in compliance or reporting requirements, as well as stakeholder changes, for example: 
 Changes in local/state/federal government involvement as a stakeholder. 
 Departmental changes e.g. introduction/removal/merges/overlaps. 
Although administrative changes may be less significant than policy changes, they can create 
issues in practicality, for example increasing compliance costs, or time spent building 
stakeholder relations. 
iv.  Duration of Change 
Importantly, but often overlooked, is the duration of time over which the change occurs. For 
example, the time taken for legislation to be enacted or repealed represents a time period of 
extreme uncertainty where results could swing either way.  Further, whether or not a final 
change does eventually occur, the period during which debates or negotiations ensue, is in itself 
detrimental. 
2. Policy Design 
The design of a policy plays a fundamental role in its long-term stability. It is a significant 
challenge for governments to design policy that can balance stable long-term commitments and 
yet be flexible and adaptable to change and development. Although a stakeholder might not 
participate in the design of a policy, it is vital to be able to identify signs of potential instability 
and consequent risks, costs, and compensation. Possible considerations include: whether policy 
design effectively plans for the full product development cycle of the technology/industry; 
whether the policy attracts investment; the existence/extent of a monitoring framework; 
whether the policy ends; and if the policy is based on accurate modelling. It is also critical to 
consider the objectives of the policy and any interactions that could ensue. Not limited to, the 
relative importance of each objective and identifying conflicts in multi-targeted policy designs.  
3. Jurisdictional Interaction 
Particularly in nations like Australia with several levels of government, the relationship 
between jurisdictions can have a significant impact on policy stability. A business is potentially 
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susceptible to policy risk at both a federal and state level, and a business operating nationally 
can be susceptible to varying types and severities of risks in each State of operation. The 
interaction between state and federal legislation is also of key importance, with one policy 
potentially creating unexpected issues for the other and likely prompting change in response.  
4. Policy Reviews 
The Oxford English Dictionary [34] defines a review as “a formal assessment of something 
with the intention of instituting change if necessary”. In the context of government policy, 
reviews can take two forms: 
i. A report or evaluation of past policy. This form can have positive impacts on policy 
instability, as it potentially identifies the causes of negative implications as well as 
solutions. 
ii. A report or evaluation of present policy. This form will generally foster an environment 
of policy instability, as by definition, its commencement represents possible change, 
thus triggering a period of uncertainty. It is important to note this period of uncertainty 
occurs, regardless of whether the review actually eventuates in change. 
 
5. Long-term Strategic Outlook 
This concerns the government having a long-term strategic outlook that is not necessarily 
locked into policy.  It encompasses statements made by government, including information in 
government documents and websites. Often ‘goals’ can serve to provide an indication of a long-
term outlook and provide an ‘impression’ of current and future policy environments.  For 
example, an excerpt from the Australian Government, Energy White Paper [35] states, 
“renewable energy will play an important part in Australia’s long-term greenhouse response, 
and the Australian Government will continue its extensive and effective support for these 
technologies”. Although not legislated, this statement both acknowledges the RE sector, and 
indicates future support.  However, any conflicts with current policy, or policy from another 
jurisdiction, or other long term strategies, can raise questions about which direction the 
government is actually headed, resulting in an environment of uncertainty. 
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4 POLICY INSTABILITY IN AUSTRALIA 
A literature review found that the aforementioned five sources of policy instability, had 
different influences in different settings. Thus, it was appropriate to identify seven factors which 
contributed to an environment of policy instability in Australia, and examine each on a case 
study basis. Four of these factors relate to specific policies and government institutions, while 
the remainder focus on select aspects of the ‘five sources’. While it is acknowledged that 
periods of stability have existed, it is important to note that this analysis is limited to an 
investigation of policy instability only. This is a consequence of the thesis objectives, and the 
significant scope required to analyse both the stable and unstable aspects. A tabulated summary 
of important events (Table 4.6) is provided in Section 4.8 for reference. 
4.1 The Renewable Energy Target 
The Renewable Energy Target (RET) was identified as a key factor contributing towards an 
environment of policy instability. Due to significant changes in the policy design, this case 
study separately analyses three different forms of the policy from 2001-2009, 2009-2013 and 
2013-2016. Reviews of the RET were identified as the key source of instability and are analysed 
separately thereafter.  
4.1.1 The Mandatory Renewable Energy Target from 2001-2009 
The federal legislation Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 came into effect in April 2001, 
and has been Australia’s key renewable energy policy since. The objectives stated in the act 
are: 
a) “to encourage the additional generation of electricity from renewable sources; and 
b) to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases in the electricity sector; and 
c) to ensure that renewable energy sources are ecologically sustainable.” [36] 
The initial implementing measure of the Act was the Mandatory Renewable Energy Target 
(MRET), an incremental generation increase of 9,500 GWh by 2010 which was to be 
maintained until 2020, as specified in Table 4.1. In reference to Table 3.2, this is classified as 
a Quota Driven Regulatory Policy Instrument.  As such, the Government placed a legal 
obligation on entities purchasing wholesale electricity to annually submit a proportional number 
of Renewable Energy Certificates (REC) to the established Office of the Renewable Energy 
Regulator. REC’s can be purchased from accredited RE power systems, where each REC 
represents 1 MWh of energy produced from RE technology. Once created, a REC is placed on 
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the Green Electricity Market or sold via bilateral deals [37]. Anyone can sell or buy on the 
market, and REC’s can be ‘hoarded’ indefinitely.  
Table 4.1: Incremental GWh Increase [36] 
 
The Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 remained practically unchanged in this current 
form until 2009. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, wind power created the largest number of REC’s, 
equivalent to over 9,000 GWh of electricity generated. While small generation solar units and 
to a greater extent, large generation solar units were minor contributors to the scheme. This is 
in line with the general development of these sectors as previously shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 4.1: Renewable Energy Certificates created by 31st December 2008 [38] 
4.1.1.1  Policy Design Issues 
As mentioned in Section 3.3, although a stakeholder might not participate in the design of a 
policy, it is vital to be able to identify signs of potential instability and a variety of consequential 
risks, costs, and compensation issues.  A potential design issue with the MRET that can be 
identified by firms, is in regard to its objectives which are multi-targeted towards RE 
technology, climate change and compliance with environmental laws.   
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Multi-targeted objectives affecting renewable energy firms have implications for policy 
instability for two main reasons: 
1. Uncertainty exists concerning the relative priorities of each objective. For example, 
what are the outcomes when objectives are in conflict; and which objectives will be 
prioritised and for how long. 
2. Greater policy scope increases susceptibility to policy instability. For example, in the 
case of the RET, large-scale wind projects are also susceptible to changes in climate 
change policy and changes to all other types of RE technology. Yet, government 
changes to climate change policy can act as a ‘warning sign’ that changes to large-scale 
wind are perhaps imminent. Conversely, investors may also detect the ‘warning signs’ 
and reduce investment. 
Another question raised in Section 3.3 was in regard to how the policy design planned for the 
whole development cycle of the technology/industry. For example, the GWh generation targets 
were quite modest and it became evident just a few years into the scheme that the actual 
cumulative generation was far excess of the target. This modest target coupled with a policy 
end date in 2020, significantly impacted on the payback period of large-scale generation. The 
first policy review conducted in 2003 recognised the investment uncertainty created by the 
policy design, and predicted a boom and bust cycle with investment stalling by 2007 [39]. The 
government did not accept the review recommendations to increase the target. Consequently, 
from 2004/2005 onwards, the difference between the two significantly decreased, though still 
18% greater than legislated.  This is in comparison with the first few years of the policy, during 
which time REC creation was up to 67% greater than legislated targets, as seen in Figure 4.2. 
 
Figure 4.2: Actual and Required Annual REC Creation 
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4.1.1.2 Multi-jurisdictional Issues 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, both state and territory governments have legislative power to 
introduce their own RE targets and policies. In response to the unambitious federal policy 
design, many states introduced their own RE targets around 2006-2007. These varied 
significantly by state: 
 Victoria ─10% of electricity generation by 2016. 
 South Australia ─ 20% of electricity generation by 2020. 
 New South Wales ─ 10% of electricity consumption by 2010 (planned). [40] 
The introduction of state legislation adds another layer of complexity.  A company operating 
nationally is now not only susceptible to policy risk from federal policy changes, but their 
operations are also susceptible to different risks in each state. Furthermore, the interaction 
between state and federal legislation can be of key importance, with one policy potentially 
creating unexpected issues for the other and likely prompting change in response. 
4.1.2 The Renewable Energy Target from 2009-2013 
In 2009 the Renewable Energy (Electricity) Act 2000 was amended, renaming the MRET to the 
RET and aiming to generate at least 20% of Australia’s electricity supply from Renewable 
sources by 2020.  
The most significant changes made include: 
 Changing the 2010 target from 9500 GWh to 45 000 GWh in 2020, and maintaining 
that level until 2030. 
 Introducing Solar Credits (see Case Study 1) 
 Allowing state-based renewable energy targets enacted under state legislation to 
transition to the RET. 
These changes addressed some of the previously discussed issues of policy instability, including 
the ‘boom and bust cycle’, long term investment, stalling investment, and multi-jurisdictional 
issues. 
This form of the RET however, was short-lived after an ongoing COAG consultation paper 
recommended splitting the RET into separate large and small-scale targets in 2010. This change 
was in response to a higher than expected uptake of small-scale systems (mainly Solar PV) 
which created a large spike in the number of certificates being created. This spike depressed 
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prices from $56/MWh to $28/MWh between April and October 2009, significantly impacting 
investment certainty of large-scale projects with high initial investment costs.  Indeed, the 
Office of the Renewable Energy Regulator Annual Report [38] stated that, “the aim of the split 
is to ensure that both large-scale and small-scale renewable energy systems are supported. In 
particular, the separation of the target encourages investment certainty for large-scale 
generators”. The same report [38] also identified the following causes for the higher than 
expected uptake: 
 The financial incentive from the solar multiplier was overly generous. 
 Falling system costs due to increasing large-scale production from increased uptake. 
 Interactions with a state introduced FiT (multi-jurisdictional issues). 
As of the 1st January 2011 the RET was split into the 41,000 GWh Large-scale Renewable 
Energy Target (LRET) and Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) with a notional but 
uncapped 4,000 GWh target by 2020. The annual targets were changed from those introduced 
in 2009 to reflect the split.  
4.1.2.1 Policy Design and Multi-jurisdictional issues 
The required splitting of the target shows how the ‘one size fits all’ approach of the policy 
design was seriously flawed. Small-scale and large-scale projects have completely different 
project lifetimes and payback periods requiring completely different incentives to stimulate 
activity. It also highlights a case of multi-jurisdictional issues, where combined federal and state 
legislation amplified the financial incentive for small-scale Solar PV.  Consequently, a company 
would not only need to predict how changes in their sector might prompt policy change, but 
also consider growth and change in other sectors. This is in addition to not only considering 
federal legislation but also legislation in their own, and other states, as well as the interactions 
between the two. After considering all these factors, a company would then need to predict and 
manage the risk of how the government would respond to these Solar PV issues, and then how 
this response would affect large-scale wind projects. 
CASE STUDY 1 – SOLAR CREDITS 
In 2009 the federal government introduced Solar Credits to replace the Solar Homes and 
Communities Program (SHCP). The policy was “intended to provide an upfront capital cost 
subsidy worth around $7,500 by applying a multiplier – initially set at five- to certificates 
generated from small generation units” [1].  
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However, the combination of a strong Australian dollar, falling system costs due to 
increasing mass manufacturing, and interactions with generous state introduced subsidies 
significantly reduced the cost of PV installations. The large price drop in small residential 
PV that occurred in from 2009-2010 can be seen in Figure 4.3, which shows prices prior to 
any assistance from government policy. The generous State FiT policies in place during 
2010 are presented in Table 4.2 for reference. As a result, Solar PV installations increased 
dramatically as shown in Figure 4.4. The Solar Credits policy amplified the growth of the 
sector and created multiple ‘phantom credits’ which flooded the market, causing the REC 
price to drop and investment in large-scale investment to stall. The price volatility also had 
negative consequences for small-scale providers who were then unable to provide accurate 
information to customers in respect to the price they would potentially achieve for their 
certificates.  
 
Figure 4.3: Trends in Australian PV System Costs, 2000–2013*  [4] 
        *nominal dollars, prior to SRES assistance 
 
Figure 4.4: Number of Annual PV Installations** [7] 
             **2007 includes all pre-2007 installations 
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Table 4.2: Premium Feed-in Tariff Policies in Place During 2010 
State Max size 
(kW) 
Rate 
($/MWh) 
Duration 
(years) 
Approximate pay-back Period 
(years) 
Victoria 5 $600 (net) 15 6.5 
South Australia 30 $540 (net) 20 7.5 
New South Wales 10 $600 (gross) 7 2 
Queensland 30 $440 (net) 20 9 
Australian Capital 
Territory 
30 $450 (gross) 20 2.5 
In an effort to control the rapid growth, the government revised the solar multiple three 
times, as shown in Table 4.3. It is important to note that the first two revisions occurred 
within six months of each other, and the final revision gave consumers and industry only 
six weeks warning for program closure. Each proposed reduction in the multiplier not only 
placed stress on the government’s administrative capability to process applications in a 
timely manner, but also created artificial boom-and-bust cycles work cycles for installers. 
This can be seen in Figure 4.4, which shows how annual growth in the number of 
installations went from 372% to -5% within four years.  Each change to a subsidised good, 
will naturally induce change for the providers of the good.  When such change reduces a 
financial incentive, then business turnover will likely reduce, and providers can be left with 
surplus product, plus an unexpected reduction in their future income stream.  A royal 
commission submission into a government energy efficiency program [6] described some 
of these consequences:  
Many businesses found themselves with an immediate freezing of their cash flow.  
As a result, many businesses had ongoing commitments to suppliers with forward 
orders that could not be met. Businesses were left with commitments on property 
leases, vehicles, equipment, and held insulation stock which could not be moved and 
no longer had any appreciable value.  
Table 4.3: Changes Made to Solar Credits 
Start Date Initial 1 December 2010 5 May 2011 16 Nov 2012 
June 2009 5x    
July 2010 5x 5x 5x  
July 2011 5x 4x 3x  
July 2012 4x 3x 2x 2x 
January 2013 4x 3x 2x END 
July 2013 3x 2x END  
July 2014 2x END   
July 2015 END    
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4.1.3 The Renewable Energy Target from 2013-2016 
On the 18th of September 2013, the new Coalition government was sworn in, and immediately 
announced the repeal of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism, as well as various climate change and 
RE related policies.  Despite Coalition policy prior to the election being to retain the current 
target, the then Prime Minister Tony Abbott, indicated at the end of 2013 that the RET could 
be reduced or removed dependent upon the outcome of the next review. These comments 
represented the end of 12 years of bi-partisanship support for the RET, and the start of an 18-
month period of uncertainty. 
As seen in Table 4.6 in October 2014 the government proposed a reduction of the LRET from 
41,000 GWh to 26,00 GWh by 2020. However due to lack of bipartisan support, a policy 
‘gridlock’ ensued. After rejection of the 26,000 GWh target, on the 2nd of March 2015, the 
CASE STUDY 2 – REC Price Sensitivity 
The sensitivity of REC prices to political changes, can be seen in Figure 4.5. The 2004 price 
decrease in REC’s coincides with capacity meeting the governments unambitious targets, 
and subsequent lack of target increases. This changes dramatically leading up to the 2007 
election when new increased targets were announced and subsequently introduced. The 
dramatic price drops due to oversupply, exacerbated by the solar multiplier, as well as the 
splitting of the policy, are reflected in the price changes. 
 
Figure 4.5: LGC (formerly REC) Price & total Renewable Revenue [5] 
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Government proposed a revised LRET target of 31,000 GWh, which was consequently also 
rejected by the opposition. On the 8th of May 2015, the Government and the Opposition reached 
an agreement on a revised LRET target of 33,000 GWh. The legislation was subsequently 
passed by the senate on the 23rd June 2015, essentially ending the 18-month period of extreme 
policy uncertainty [41]. 
4.1.3.1 Justification of the Proposed Change 
The 41,000 GWh target to provide ‘at least 20% of Australia’s electricity supply by 2020’ was 
based on a predicted increase in electricity demand. However, from 2009 onwards, electricity 
consumption actually decreased. The trend of increasing electricity consumption to 2009 and 
consequent reduction can be seen in Figure 4.6 on a national level, and in Figure 4.7 specific to 
the NEM. As a result, the Abbott government’s main justification for reducing the RET was 
that the 41,000 GWh no longer represented 20% of Australia’s’ 2020 electricity supply and 
should be reduced to a 'real 20%' target of approximately of 26,000 GWh to reflect the reduced 
demand. The demand decrease can be attributed to many factors including the global financial 
crisis, increased costs, and reduced manufacturing. 
It is important to note that electricity consumption in non-NEM jurisdictions like Western 
Australia actually increased during this period, in part compensating for NEM reductions on a 
national level. However, as the NEM accounts for over 90% of the nation’s load, these increases 
were often overlooked.  
Figure 4.6: Australia's Gross Electricity Production [17] 
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Figure 4.7: National Electricity Market Production [17] 
There were two key flaws in the Abbott governments justification for reducing the target: 
 Firstly, the original legislation governing the RET made no specific reference to the 
intention of ‘at least 20% by 2020’.  Rather, it explicitly stated a set target of 41,000 
GWh by 2020.  For simplicity, however, the percentage figure was often used as it 
provided more context and better public understanding. 
 Secondly, given the reduced demand prediction, the 41,000 GWh would have accounted 
for around 23-27% of Australia's consumption.  Thus, the ‘at least 20% by 2020’ 
intention was satisfied, without requiring legislative change. 
It is important to note that both points are key components for ensuring policy stability. The 
41,000 GWh was designed to be a fixed target enacted in legislation, providing long-term 
certainty for investors and industry. While the intent of ‘at least’ gave stakeholders the certainty 
that regardless of other factors, 20% was to be the minimum benchmark.  
The consequences of the governments justification are extensive.  Considering only policy 
intent and ignoring the actual legislation, debases not only the significance of legislation, but 
also its purpose.  There is a broadening of the scope of risk, as industry and investment 
stakeholders need to consider a change being made on the basis of ‘policy intent’, as well as 
the reliability of something not inscribed into legislation, in addition to other legislative and 
environmental factors. However most importantly, and specific to the LRET, is that the 
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successful GWh reduction on this basis links the LRET with electricity demand. The uncertainty 
surrounding electricity demand is amongst the key risks for retailers and distributors, with 
copious research dedicated to forecasting models. Yet by linking the LRET with demand, the 
RE industry not only became susceptible to demand uncertainty, but also to uncertainty 
surrounding how the government reacts to these changes. This raises numerous questions, for 
example ‘what demand variance warrants a change?’, ‘what form will this change take?’, ‘will 
the government even propose a change?’.  For example, as seen in Figure 4.6, electricity 
demand began to decrease in 2009, yet the government didn’t propose a change for another five 
years. As the link is not prescribed in legislation, there is then no legislation dictating when, 
how or if the government will propose a change. 
4.1.3.2 Issues Due to the Duration of Change 
The 18-month period of uncertainty surrounding the future of the RET, highlights the 
importance of the ‘duration of change’. The extended length of time required to pass the 
legislation was primarily due to a lack of bi-partisan support, which led to gridlock in the senate. 
As outlined in Section 3.3 the government rarely has a majority in the senate, and thus relies on 
support from the senate cross-bench to pass partisan legislation. As the initial government 
proposal of 26,000 GWh did not receive sufficient support, an extended period of negotiations 
ensued. The consequences of which were not fully anticipated. Namely, an 88% reduction of 
investment in large-scale renewable energy from 2013-2014 which dropped Australia’s global 
ranking in large-scale investment from 11th in 2013 to 39th in 2014, and is almost wholly 
attributed to the uncertainty surrounding the target [42].  
4.1.4 Reviews of the Renewable Energy Target 
The legislative amendments introduced in 2010 also included a biennial review of the target. 
Reviews of the RET have since been one of the largest sources of instability.  
4.1.4.1 Tambling Review 2003-2004 
The first review into the then MRET was commonly known as the ‘Tambling Review’ and took 
place from March to September 2003, with the report released to the public in January 2004. 
The Howard government responded in June 2004 approximately 9 months after receipt of the 
report. As previously discussed, the review recognised the investment uncertainty created by 
the policy design, and predicted a boom and bust cycle with investment stalling by 2007, 
recommending that the target be increased to avoid this [39]. The government did not accept 
the recommendations. 
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4.1.4.2 COAG Consultation Paper (Review) Ongoing 2009-2012 
A COAG review titled the, ‘COAG Review of Specific RET Issues (the Review)’ commenced 
in 2009 and a draft was published later that year. However due to significant policy changes the 
final report was not published until March 2012 [43]. It is important to note that this was not a 
review of the entire RET legislation, and as foreshadowed by the name, was centred on three 
specific RET issues: 
1. Whether any new small-scale technologies should be made eligible under the RET. 
2. Whether changes should be made to provisions granting exemptions from RET liability 
for 'self-generated' electricity, mainly affecting remote resource projects. 
3. Whether new waste coal mine gas projects should be made eligible under the RET. [43] 
There is no indication or mention of instability or associated issues in regard to this review in 
any consequent reports. This is most likely due to the clear and specific review objectives, and 
its lack of statutory status.  
4.1.4.3 Climate Change Authority 2012 Statutory Review  
The next independent review was conducted in 2012 by the Climate Change Authority (CCA). 
The CCA was enacted in 2011 in a governance role, to conduct independent reviews and 
provide recommendations on several climate change initiatives including the RET.  The first of 
its four legislative objectives is “increasing confidence and predictability” [1] of climate change 
governance. The CCA released an issues paper in August 2012, followed by the final report 
which was released to the government in December 2012. The government responded in March 
2013 [44].  
The first recommendation made by the 2012 CCA review [1] was that, “given the importance 
it attaches to supporting investor confidence […] the Authority’s recommendation is that the 
frequency of scheduled reviews should be amended from every two years to every four years”. 
The government agreed to change the review period to every four years, noting that it “agrees 
that full reviews every four years would provide an appropriate balance between flexibility in 
the scheme and policy stability for investments” [44]. As this alteration would be a legislative 
change, the government at the time planned to introduce it as part of a package of other 
legislative changes at the end of 2013 [44]. 
It is important to note that policy stability and investor confidence weighed heavily as one of 
the main issues in this review, and that government views at the time were on par with the CCA, 
rejecting only 3 of the 34 recommendations.  In its response, the government also noted that, “a 
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change to the target (either an increase or a decrease) would create instability in the renewable 
energy industry; impact on the risk premiums required by lenders and investors; and decrease 
the likelihood of any target being met” [44]. 
However, of the 34 recommendations only 11 recommended change, and of these, 3 were 
administrative changes, 2 were rejected, 3 required further work, and ultimately the whole 
review process resulted in only three actual changes to the scheme [11]. The government 
essentially commissioned a review which in virtue of itself introduces the concept of potential 
change and potential instability, only to then not make any changes as they didn’t want to 
promote policy uncertainty. Clifton and Simpson [11] also recognised this in their analysis of 
the CCA review: 
Given no great changes have been suggested to promote increased uptake of renewable 
energy, or conversely to provide additional support for electricity consumers suffering 
under the burden of the RET, the review process is likely to have caused more harm 
than good purely by introducing a perception of policy uncertainty.  
The 2012 CCA review demonstrates how reviews, and even the potential of a review can create 
policy instability, regardless of whether any changes are actually made. Nonetheless, at this 
stage it is clear that the government had recognised policy instability as an issue, made a prompt 
response, was listening to the independent body CCA and industry, and was actively taking 
steps to reduce instability. 
4.1.4.4 Warburton Review 
As per Table 4.6 a new additional review with wide ranging objectives was announced in 
February 2014 to be chaired by Mr Dick Warburton AO LVO and consequently released in 
August 2014. This review was considered to be extremely controversial for a number of 
reasons. 
1. A legislated statutory review of the of the RET by the CCA was due in late 2014. 
The previous government had acknowledged reviews as a trigger for policy uncertainty, doing 
more harm than good and was planning on reducing the frequency of reviews. Yet in disregard 
to this and all previous evidence from industry and literature, the government commissioned a 
new review to coincide the same year as a legislated CCA review.  The Minister for 
Environment Greg Hunt noted, “the review will advise the Government on [..] the importance 
of investment certainty” [45].  Although the government had planned to abolish the CCA, the 
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Warburton review was announced given that the CCA had not been abolished and would 
conduct its legislated review. 
2. Although described as an “independent expert panel”, the panel was appointed by two 
Government Ministers and assigned to report to directly to the Prime Minister [45]. 
The ‘hand picking’ of panellists was particularly controversial given that nearly all those 
selected were either currently, or formerly, heavily invested in the fossil fuel industry.  Former 
Caltex Australia Chairman Dick Warburton was selected as Chair, a self-proclaimed climate 
sceptic who had co-authored articles questioning the findings of mainstream science about 
climate change.  Shirley In't Veld, former chief executive of Verve Energy, responsible for 
operating Western Australia’s largest coal generators.  Matt Zema, managing director and chief 
executive of the Australian Energy Market Operator. Lastly, Brian Fischer, former head of the 
Department of Agriculture and Water Resources.  
There were numerous calls for Dr Brian Fischer to step down due to conflicts of interest. Dr 
Fischer is managing director of consultancy BAEconomics [46], and his modelling had been 
used in a submission from the Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association 
(APPEA), to the 2012 CCA review, calling for the abolishment of the RET. The CCA had 
previously rejected Dr Fisher’s modelling and conclusions, primarily on the basis that his 
financial modelling ignored the reduction of the wholesale electricity price associated with 
renewable energy. Notwithstanding, APPEA ‘resubmitted’ the same modelling to the 
Warburton review, where Dr Fisher was acting in the capacity of an ‘independent expert 
panellist’.  
3. The review had an essentially unlimited scope. 
“The review is to examine the operation and costs and benefits of the Renewable Energy 
(Electricity) Act 2000 (‘the Act’) and related legislation and regulations, and the RET scheme 
constituted by these instruments” [45].  As previously mentioned, a targeted review with a 
limited scope, only raises uncertainty around changes constrained to limited specific area, or 
between a few specific outcomes.  On the contrary, the expansive scope of the Warburton 
review inherently created an environment of uncertainty for the whole RET. 
4. Conflict between results and recommendations. 
The panel found the RET had met its objectives of increasing small-scale and large-scale 
generation, as well as reducing carbon emissions. Furthermore, it found an increased RET 
would decrease power prices, and a decreased RET would increase power prices. Yet the panel 
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recommended closing the LRET to new entrants or reducing it to match a variable 20% of 
electricity demand, and abolishing or bringing forward the phase out of the SRES. Furthermore, 
it determined that “the shift to the lower mandated RET improves coal-fired generators’ values 
by around $9.1 billion” [47]. While in respect to the lower RET, “wealth transfers are occurring 
from existing generators to both new renewable energy projects and consumers” [47]. Yet these 
‘wealth transfers’ were not considered in a cost-benefit analysis, with the modelling firm 
stating, “an economic evaluation of the (RET) policy would not normally include wealth 
transfers where either producers or consumers benefit at the expense of each other. This makes 
projected changes to retail electricity prices mostly irrelevant in any economic assessment of 
the policy” [48]. These results conflict with the press release for the review, where the 
Environment Minister stated the review would consider the “costs and benefits for the 
renewable energy sector, […] and Australian households” [45], in addition to justifying the 
repeal of the carbon tax on the basis that “the Government is committed to easing the pressure 
of electricity prices for families and business”, as the “carbon tax drives up the price of 
electricity but has had no significant impact on emissions” [45].  
It is noteworthy that the majority of the reviews findings were at odds with the 
recommendations given to the government.  Despite this the government endorsed the 
recommendations, and used them as a basis for a proposed RET reduction, with some 
recommendations explicitly stated in the amendment bill explanatory memorandum [49]. 
Particularly given the selection of panellists, and modelling assumptions, the Warburton review 
received significant media attention pertaining to bias and inconsistency on behalf of the 
government – a situation tending to destabilise, rather than enhance the policy environment.   
4.1.4.5 Climate Change Authority 2014 Statutory Review 
In December 2014 the CCA released their statutory review.  The review had suffered a reduced 
scope and restrictions on resources due to budget cuts, and the government had also attempted 
to abolish the authority. The review made only two recommendations, firstly to defer the 2020 
target by a few years, and secondly for the government to consider increasing and extending 
the RET policy beyond 2020 [4]. Policy stability was again a prominent issue, with the report 
[4] stating a, “sharp decline in investor confidence, [and] the resulting slowdown in investment” 
as justification for its first recommendations. The government responded to the review in 
August 2015, ‘noting’ both recommendations without comment.  
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4.2 Wind Power Reviews 
Although the RET is the most significant policy to have addressed large-scale wind power, the 
industry has also been subject to ongoing investigations, including inquiries, reviews and 
academic research. In addition to the aforementioned three RET reviews, eight other 
investigations have been carried out on both state and federal levels as outlined in Table 4.4 
from 2010-2015. Note that Table 4.4 does not include reviews and changes to planning and 
other regulatory guidelines which also occurred in this timeframe. The majority of these 
investigations were focused on the link between human health and wind farms. Indeed, the 
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), a commonwealth entity providing 
leading scientific research in the areas of health and medical research, includes wind farms as 
one its key health concerns, alongside proven major health risks such as the prevention of 
obesity, and prevention of infectious diseases. 
A large body of research has been focused on finding a link between human health and wind 
farms, yet no conclusive peer reviewed scientific evidence has been found. Commonly referred 
to as ‘wind turbine syndrome’, the adverse health effects reportedly experienced by residents 
living in proximity to wind turbines, is overwhelmingly attributed to the ‘nocebo effect’. The 
‘nocebo’ effect is essentially opposite to the ‘placebo effect’, in that an inert substance causes 
adverse health effects, though no biological evidence to support this is present. This rationale 
has been supported by numerous studies, including Pedersen et al [50], which concluded 
individuals not benefitting economically from wind farms, were far more likely to experience 
adverse health effects than those who did benefit economically.  Similarly, a 2013 
Environmental Protection Agency [51] study mentioned in Table 4.4, found that reportedly 
adverse effects often “coincided with shutdowns of the plant”.  
Despite a lack of (conclusive peer reviewed) scientific evidence linking adverse health with 
wind farms, federal and government agencies continue to investigate the issue. More 
importantly, agencies have often directly linked the investigative outcomes with public policy. 
For example, Engineers Australia [52] reported that according to NHRMC CEO Anne Kelso, 
the outcomes of research projects, would assist in developing policy and public health 
recommendations regarding wind turbine development and operations in Australia. Given the 
frequency and ongoing nature of these investigations, statements directly linking results to 
policy outcomes, serves as an additional driver of policy uncertainty. 
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Table 4.4: Wind Power Investigations 2010-2015 [53] [54] [55]  
Date Type of Investigation 
Oct 2015 Department of Environment Independent Scientific 
Committee on Wind Turbines. 
Nov 2014: Announcement 
Aug 2015: Release of Final Report 
Senate – Select Committee on Wind Turbines 
2012 – 2015 National Health and Medical Research Council – NHMRC 
Statement and Information Paper: Evidence on Wind Farms 
and Human Health 
2013 South Australia, Environmental Protection Agency –
Infrasound levels near windfarms and in other 
environments 
2013 South Australia, Environmental Protection Agency –
Waterloo Wind Farm Environmental noise study 
Jun 2012: First reading in the Senate 
Feb 2013: Second reading negatived 
Senate Bill – Renewable Energy (Electricity) Amendment 
(Excessive Noise from Wind Farms) Bill 2012 
Mar 2012 – Feb 2014 
 
South Australia State Parliament – Select Committee on 
Wind Farm Developments in South Australia 
Oct 2010: Announcement 
Jun 2011: Release of Final Report 
Sep 2012: Government Response 
Senate Inquiry – The Social and Economic Impact of Rural 
Wind Farms 
 
2010 NHMRC Public Statement & Evidence Review: Wind 
Turbines and Health 
4.3 Solar Specific Policy 
There have been many government policies specifically promoting growth of both the Solar PV 
and Concentrating Solar Power (CSP) industries, with both heavily influenced by policy 
instability. Most of the State FiT schemes mentioned in Table 4.2 have been subject to excessive 
change and budget blow out due to unexpectedly high uptakes not predicted by engineering 
models. A typical example of this is the NSW 7-year Solar Bonus Scheme which was 
terminated after just 18 months. A review of the scheme by Martin and Rice [56] notes the 
investor reaction to policy change and the consequences for industry: 
Noting the policy shift, 38,000 investors purchased or leased Solar PV systems on 27 
October 2010 and lodged applications for grid connection by the November 2010 
deadline. This event generated a huge consumer demand for solar panels, electricity 
invertors units, cabling and electrical fittings; and large industry demand for certified 
electricians and installation technicians in NSW. Continued investor activity forced the 
NSW government to close entry to the SBS in April 2011, with the scheme officially 
terminated in June 2011.  
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Given the short-lived nature of the State FiT schemes, Federal Solar policy was deemed more 
appropriate for further analysis by providing a context of instability over a larger time frame. 
Specifically, the Photovoltaic Rebate Program and the Solar Flagships Program aimed at 
increasing the uptake of small-scale solar (PV only) and large-scale solar, respectively. 
4.3.1 The Photovoltaic Rebate Program 
The solar Photovoltaic Rebate Program (PVRP) was a federal rebate grant program, funded 
through the Measures for Better Environment (1999) legislative package “to encourage the 
long-term use of photovoltaic technology, increase renewable energy in Australia, reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, assist in the development of the photovoltaic industry, and increase 
public awareness of renewable energy” [57]. From its announcement in May 1999 to closure in 
June 2009, the program was a key source of policy change. A timeline of the most significant 
changes is provided in Figure 4.8. 
 
Figure 4.8: PVRP Timeline from 1999 to 2009 
 
1999 May 
• PVRP is announced
• Four year policy duration, commencing June 2000
• Cap of $5,500
2000 Jan 
• Policy commencement date brought forward 6 months to January 2000
• Rebate set at $5.50/W for systems of at least 450W 
• Cap increased to $8,250
2000 Oct
• Rebate reduced to $5.00/W
• Cap reduced to $7,500
2003 Feb • A cap is placed on the total number of monthly approvals
2003 May
• Anoounced that policy will be extended until 1 July 2005
• Rebate reduced to $4.00/W 
• Cap reduced to $4000
2004 Feb • Monthly approval cap is removed after 12 months
2005 May
• Announced policy would again be extended until 2007
• Extension prompted a review which suggested incrementally reducing the rebate
2007 May
• Rebate doubled to $8/W
• Cap doubled to $8000
2007 Nov
• Change in Government
• Scheme is renamed 'Solar Homes and Communities Program"
• Remote PV systems are excluded
2008 May • Means test is introduced. Only families with taxable incomes below $100,000 are eligible 
2009 June 9th
• Government announces scheme wiould end effective midnight that day
• Over 4,000 applications are recieved
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The early program announcement was one of the first causes of instability. As found by the 
Auditor-general [57], the early announcement of the program in 1999, 
created an immediate expectation in the market for the pending subsidy. However, the 
Australian Greenhouse Office was not able to progress the program at that time, as the 
necessary appropriation and delivery agreements were not in place. This led to an initial 
slump in sales of photovoltaic units prior to the introduction of the program.  
As a result, the commencement date was brought forward and rebate increased. However, this 
caused demand to exceed supply and the rebate was consequently reduced after 10 months. The 
Auditor-general [57] noted that the lack of a program risk assessment had “significant 
‘downstream’ implications”. Measures were again taken in 2003 due to a higher than 
anticipated demand, including a monthly approvals cap and reduced rebate that was introduced 
coinciding with a 2 year extension of the program. The programs funding was also increased 
from $31 million to $34.6 million for the period 2000/01 to 2003/04 [57]. 
A consequent program extension was announced in 2005, triggering a review which 
recommended a 50c reduction, in 10c increments until 2007. Although it was announced that 
the rebate would be reduced in incremental 10-cent reductions from $4.00/W to $3.50/W until 
June 2007, this was never implemented [58]. Instead, in May 2007 the government announced 
the program would be doubled to $8/W and with a maximum household cap of $8,000.  
After a change in government in 2007, the PVRP was rebranded the Solar Homes and 
Communities Program (SHCP). The doubling of the program again resulted in higher than 
anticipated demand, leading to the introduction of means testing in 2008. Although this was 
predicted to reduce applications, they surged from 11,000 in 2007/2008 to over 121,000 in 
2008/2009, and the government announced on the 9th of June 2009 that the program would end 
effective midnight that day [59]. 
The sudden surge and close of the program highlights the consequences of policy instability 
straining government resources. Lack of resources delayed the processing of applications, by 
August 2009 there was a backlog of 75,000 applications waiting on approval [59]. Furthermore, 
the increase in both installations and installers reduced the number of inspections from 5% to 
0.25% of installed systems, the 2010 audit [59] noted that, “this substantially reduced the level 
of assurance available to the department and introduced the risk of sub-standard installation at 
a critical period of record numbers of installations”.  
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A risk assessment was conducted in 2007 following the restructuring of the program in 
accordance with the recommendations of the 2003-2004 audit. Although this assessment 
identified an anticipated surge in demand as a risk, no risk management processes were put in 
place. This had significant financial implications, for example, reported government 
expenditure on the program from 2007–08 to 30 June 2009 was $257.7 million compared to the 
original budget estimate of $46.75 million [59]. Figure 4.9 depicts the cost/watt of Solar PV 
systems and the number of installed systems for the lifetime of the program.  
 
Figure 4.9: On-grid PV Cost/Watt and Systems Installed from 2000 to 2009 [59] 
4.3.2 The Solar Flagships Program       
Although the RET has been the Australian governments key policy for increasing the uptake of 
large-scale RE, an attempt to specifically target utility-scale solar occurred via the introduction 
of the Solar Flagships Program (SFP). 
The Australian Government announced the $1.5 billion SFP in December 2009, with the 
purpose of developing four large-scale grid-connected solar (PV and CSP) power stations (1000 
MW by 2015) via two competitive funding rounds. Key policy dates are outlined in Figure 4.10. 
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Figure 4.10: Solar Flagships Key Dates [60, 61] 
The planned second funding round did not occur and the program has essentially resulted in 
two completed PV projects accounting for slightly over 200 MW installed capacity with nearly 
270 million funding provided from the original budget of 1.5 billion.   
The limited success of the program was predominantly due to market conditions which made it 
difficult to attain Power Purchase Agreements (PPA’s) required for finance. This was partly 
attributed to retailers ‘banking’ of REC’s from the cheap REC oversupply era of the solar 
multiplier, as well as other factors including reduced electricity demand. Indeed, other 
previously discussed policy instability issues also played a key role, with the Founding member 
of the Solar Dawn consortium, Wind Prospect CWP [62], outlining the following reasons for 
withdrawal: 
The change in direction for the project is largely a timing issue, where the market has 
been faced with a few near-term factors, including the current review of the Renewable 
Energy Target, the absorption of carbon pricing, and the progress of major energy and 
resource projects in Queensland.  
The developer of the Moree Solar Farm Fotowatio Renewable Ventures, also raised an 
important consequence of policy instability in a 2014 ‘lessons learnt’ report [23]. Specifically, 
2009 Dec •Program announced
2010 Feb •Bid submissions due
2011 Jun
•Successful project announced
•PV → Moree Solar Farm NSW (150 MWAC) 
•85% CSP, 25% Natural Gas → Solar Dawn Consortium QLD (250 MWAC)
2011 Dec •Neither project meets financial close deadline
2012 Feb
•Minister reopens round 1 for PV projects, including Moree Solar Farm 
plus  three previously shortlisted projects
2012 Jun
•Solar Flagships is absorbed into newly established ARENA 
•AGL Energy Solar Project 155 MWAC PV announced as successful project
•Funding: $166.7 million from ARENA and $64.9 million from NSW State 
Government
2012 Nov •Solar Dawn consortium announces it will not pursue with the project
2014 Aug
•ARENA announces $101.7 million funding for a reduced 56 MWAC Moree 
Solar Farm
2016 Jan •AGL Energy Solar Project commences operation
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noting that policy instability can impact the accuracy of engineering models used to underpin 
development projects: 
In the current market environment, it was challenging to select the right combination of 
assumptions to underpin the scenarios under which the modelling exercise was to be 
conducted. The challenges included:  
 The change in Government at the end of 2013 and potential change in energy policy.  
 The Renewable Energy Target (RET) review that was subsequently announced.  
4.4 Australian Renewable Energy Agency and Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation 
The Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) and the Clean Energy Finance 
Corporation (CEFC) were both established by the government in 2012 with the intention to 
advance RE in Australia. While both use public funds to achieve this, ARENA is considered 
more of a ‘grant-maker’ with a greater focus on R&D, while the CEFC is a ‘loan maker’ or 
investor in established RE projects. Figure 4.11 depicts how each agency targets its funding 
along the innovation chain.  
 
Research and Development 
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Deployment 
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Research 
Development Pilot Scale Large-Scale 
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commercial 
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Figure 4.11: ARENA and CEFC Innovation Chain Funding  
From Table 4.6 it can be seen that both organisations experienced a period of significant funding 
uncertainty. This uncertainty was due not only to proposed funding changes but also to 
numerous attempts at abolishment. Particularly regarding the abolishment of an organisation 
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which provides financial support, the consequences of policy instability vary with severity 
depending on the reallocation of said organisations funding. Three possible situations can 
potentially arise: 
1. When the funding is transferred to a similar organisation/sector and used for a similar 
purpose, the abolishment is merely an ‘administrative change´ and is likely of minor 
consequence.  
2. When the funding is transferred to a similar organisation/sector, but used for a different 
purpose. For example, if RE technology R&D funding it is reallocated to RE project 
investment, the consequences are severe for R&D, but of benefit to project investment, 
and more importantly, as the funding is reallocated within the sector it is less likely to 
impact sector investment as a whole. 
3. When funding is reallocated to a different sector, the most severe consequences to RE 
investment can occur. 
Background information on both agencies is provided prior to analysing specific implications 
of policy instability.  
4.4.1 Australian Renewable Energy Agency 
4.4.1.1 Background Information 
ARENA is a commercially oriented independent agency established as part of the Australian 
Renewable Energy Agency Act 2011. At commencement it consolidated nine other projects 
from agencies such as the Australian Solar Institute and Australian Centre for Renewable 
Energy. ARENA has two legislated objectives: 
1. Improve the competitiveness of renewable energy technologies. 
2. Increase the supply of renewable energy in Australia. 
ARENA’s funding priorities are reviewed annually, however it does take a long-term view of 
its objectives, aiming to have a maximum impact occurring in 2020-2040. The agency’s current 
five investment priorities are: 
 Integrating renewables and grids. 
 Renewables for industrial processes. 
 Off-grid areas. 
 Fringe-off-grid, and network-constrained areas. 
 Large-scale Solar PV. 
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Through its programs ARENA also helps to “improve investor confidence in renewable energy 
projects to strengthen those projects' chances of success” [63]. 
4.4.1.2 Implications for Policy Instability 
The ‘Carbon Pricing Mechanism Repeal Bills’ introduced by the Liberal party in September 
2013, included funding cuts to ARENA’s initial $3.2 billion allocation. After 10 months of 
budget uncertainty, ARENA received funding cuts of over $400 million and a reallocation of 
$370 million in funding to later years [63]. In addition to the funding uncertainty, the 
government announced in May 2014 that it intended to abolish the agency. This legislation was 
introduced a month later, passed by the lower house in September 2014 and introduced to the 
senate the next day. The legislation was not debated in the senate and ‘lapsed at prorogation’ in 
April 2016 [64].  
In the case of the abolishment of ARENA, the previously mentioned third situation occurred, 
with the government announcing its funding would be transferred to ‘consolidated revenue’, 
and indicating that only $30 million of the then $3.2 billion budget would be earmarked for 
similar projects over a two-year period ending in 2017 [63]. This has significant consequences 
for investment given that every $1 in government funding for ARENA leverages approximately 
$1.30 in private-sector R&D funding [65]. 
The uncertainty surrounding the agency’s future also had direct consequences on employment, 
which in turn had consequences on their ability to operate. In December 2014 (7 months after 
the announcement to abolish), ARENA chief executive Ivor Frischknecht told newspaper 
GovernmentNews [66] that: 
We have had a significant reduction in staff in the last few months, some related to the 
Budget and some related to the uncertainty. We’ve have lost about 40 per cent. The 
reduction of staff really limits our ability to pursue new initiatives, having new projects 
and new funding rounds.  
4.4.2 Clean Energy Finance Corporation 
4.4.2.1 Background Information 
The CEFC was established as an independent corporation operating under the Clean Energy 
Finance Corporation Act 2012, with investments commencing as of the 1st July 2013. The 
CEFC’s mission is to, “accelerate Australia's transformation towards a more competitive 
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economy in a carbon constrained world, by acting as a catalyst to increase investment in the 
clean energy sector” [67]. 
The CEFC plays a key role in managing policy instability, as it targets many of the key barriers 
faced by financiers that result from instability. This is not limited to: enabling projects without 
Power Purchase Agreements; providing liquidity; facilitating commercial bank participation; 
and providing stable long term finance. 
4.4.2.2 Implications for Policy Instability 
As can be seen in Table 4.6, after the government announced plans to abolish the CEFC in 
September 2013, an almost nine-month period of uncertainty into the existence of the 
corporation commenced. Indeed, the government made three attempts in a seven-month period 
to abolish the organisation. Notably the second attempt was a trigger for a double dissolution 
election, which is permitted to resolve deadlocks between the two houses of parliament, though 
this was not acted upon. In addition to the uncertainty regarding its own future, as a corporate 
investor in the renewables sector, the CEFC was also impacted upon by policy instability within 
the sector as a whole.  As such, policy uncertainty was a key focus of the CEFC Annual Report 
2014-15, which noted in its opening sentence that “uncertainty regarding the Renewable Energy 
Target has negatively impacted investment in large utility-scale energy projects” [68]. Due to 
a lack of new large-scale renewable projects the CEFC was forced to move its investment focus 
away from this area. The CEFC abolishment is an example of the third type of funding 
reallocation, whereby all existing assets and liabilities are transferred to the commonwealth.  
Although the CEFC generally invests in conjunction with private sector co-financiers, 
situations may arise where this is not required. Specifically, where policy risk is high, for 
example projects threatened by the reduction of the RET [68]. Given the limited options 
currently available to mitigate policy risk, uncertainty surrounding the abolishment of a key 
‘solution’ is particularly detrimental to renewable energy projects.  
After the third attempted abolishment of the corporation was unsuccessful, the government 
provided a directive to the agency to cease investment in wind and solar technology. Although 
unlawful at the time as it did not comply with the legislative mandate of the corporation, 
subsequent legislation was passed altering a clause of the corporations investment mandate “to 
focus on emerging and innovative clean energy technologies, energy efficiency and the built 
environment” [69]. Both this directive and a previous government directive that the CEFC cease 
all investment activity, were given significant media attention and raised uncertainty as to the 
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legal obligations of the corporation. These government directives also challenged the 
independent status of the CEFC, which is of particular significance in an unstable policy 
environment.  
Despite numerous government attempts to abolish the CEFC, it is important to note that the 
CEFC was operating successfully. Every $1 invested by the CEFC eventuated in $1.80 from 
private sector investment [68]. The attempted abolishment of a successful government entity 
like the CEFC, particularly contributes to an unstable policy environment by demonstrating that 
abolishment can occur even if success is evident. 
4.5 Indirect Policy 
The repeal of the Carbon Pricing Mechanism and the abolition of government agency, the 
Climate Change Authority, were identified as significant indirect drivers of policy instability. 
Background information on the Carbon Pricing Mechanism is provided before analysing its 
influence on policy instability. Background information on the Climate Change Authority was 
briefly provided in Section 4.1.4.3, thus only the implications of its abolition are considered 
here. 
4.5.1 The Carbon Pricing Mechanism 
4.5.1.1 Background information 
The most recent source of indirect policy instability in Australia has been due to the repeal of 
the Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM). The CPM was introduced in the Clean Energy Act 
2011 and related legislation, which operated for two years from the 1st of July 2012. It applied 
to Australia's biggest carbon emitters (referred to as “liable entities”), essentially defined as 
those emitting more than 25,000 tonnes CO2-e annually of covered emissions (Scope 1 
emissions with some exclusions) [70]. There were 348 potentially liable entities in 2012-2013 
and 365 in 2013-2014 with twelve of the fifteen largest emitters in 2012-2013 being primary 
activity electricity generators [71]. The CPM had an indirect effect, as it did not directly apply 
to the renewables industry. Rather, as stated in its objectives, by putting a price on greenhouse 
gas emissions it hoped to indirectly encourage investment in the renewables sector.  
The wide ranging policy objectives were: 
a) to give effect to Australia’s obligations under: 
i. the Climate Change Convention. 
ii. the Kyoto Protocol. 
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b) to support the development of an effective global response to climate change, consistent 
with Australia’s national interest in ensuring that average global temperatures increase 
by not more than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. 
c) to: 
i. take action directed towards meeting Australia’s long-term target of reducing 
Australia’s net greenhouse gas emissions to 80% below 2000 levels by 2050. 
ii. take that action in a flexible and cost-effective way. 
d) to put a price on greenhouse gas emissions in a way that: 
i. encourages investment in clean energy. 
ii. supports jobs and competitiveness in the economy. 
iii. supports Australia’s economic growth while reducing pollution.  [70] 
The policy design was quite innovative, and has been coined a ‘hybrid model’ in literature [72] 
due to its two phase design as follows: 
1. ‘Fixed price years’ [70] – Emissions are not capped and Australian Carbon Units were 
given to eligible participants for free or at a fixed price as follows: 
 2012-2013: $23 per tonne of CO2-e. 
 2013-2014: $24.15 per tonne of CO2-e.   
 2014-2015: $25.40 per tonne of CO2-e.   
2. ‘Flexible price years’ [70] – Emissions are capped and the price of carbon units are set 
by the market, mainly via an auction setting. Commencing 1st July 2015 onward. 
The first phase operates as a carbon tax in practicality before transitioning to an Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) in the second and final phase.  
On the 18th of September 2013, the newly sworn in Abbott Government announced the 
abolishment of four key climate change/renewables programs, as well as the repeal of the CPM. 
The proposed repeal of the CPM was expected, as it had been one of the key election promises 
made by the then opposition leader Tony Abbott. Nonetheless, Australia was the first nation to 
remove a mandatory carbon price, stepping back from its key climate change policy, and giving 
rise to uncertainty as to how its emissions reductions targets would be achieved.    
4.5.1.2 Policy Instability 
The ability of policies such as the CPM to achieve their indirect objectives of encouraging 
investment in the renewables sector is almost wholly dependent on policy stability. If business 
decision makers and investors can be reasonably certain that a carbon price will prevail long-
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term, it follows that investment will lean towards lower emissions industries, at a level 
dependent on the unit price, thus fulfilling policy objectives. Conversely, if investors do not 
believe that a carbon price will prevail, there is no incentive to invest (particularly in large-scale 
generation), even with an attractive unit price, in which scenario the policy objectives are not 
fulfilled.   
Leading up to its repeal, the main source of uncertainty for the CPM was due to a lack of bi-
partisan support. Bi-partisan support had previously existed with both major political parties 
including an ETS in their 2007 election platforms, however the Coalition dropped support in 
2009 by opposing Labor’s previous attempt at implementing a different ETS scheme, and 
announcing plans to repeal the CPM if elected [10].  These plans coupled with a federal election 
due to occur at the end of 2013, amplified the uncertainty surrounding the future of the policy, 
particularly as pre-emptive polling indicated a Coalition win [10].   
As shown in Table 4.6 the government introduced a package of 11 bills in November 2013, 
referred to as the ‘Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Bill 2013 and related bills’. 
These ‘related bills’ included those abolishing the CCA and the CEFC, as well as a reduction 
in ARENA funding directly bound to the Clean Energy Legislation (Carbon Tax Repeal) Bill 
2013.  The motivation for this was questionable as neither a funding cut to ARENA, nor the 
abolishment of the CCA or CEFC was required in order to repeal the CPM. Nonetheless the 
complete package of 11 bills passed the house of representatives before a motion was passed in 
the senate to consider the bills separately. The initial passage of changes to ARENA and the 
CEFC under the CPM repeal umbrella, given that neither agency has functions or objectives 
related to the CPM, highlights the inextricable nature of direct and indirect policy.  
Furthermore, the abolishment of the CCA on the basis the “Government considers that the 
Authority exists mainly to service the CPM” [73], is a direct consequence of issues associated 
with multi-targeted policy objectives. The CCA was established as an “independent advisory 
body on climate change” [1] with seven legislated functions, of which the first function is to 
conduct reviews of five different Acts. One of these Acts is the Clean Energy Act 2011, which 
governs the CPM (Carbon Pricing Mechanism). For the government to base the abolishment of 
an agency on one of many functions not only sets a precedent for future policy change but also 
highlights the importance of considering all policy functions and objectives when managing 
risk.  
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4.5.2 Abolition of the Climate Change Authority 
In November 2013 the Abbott Government introduced the Climate Change Authority 
(Abolition) Bill 2013, as part of the package of eleven bills to repeal the CPM. In addition to 
previously discussed issues regarding the governments justification for abolition, three other 
problems arose: 
1. The RET review frequency was to remain biennial. 
As discussed in 4.1.4, frequent reviews of the RET had been a key cause of policy instability. 
This had been recognised by the previous government who had intended on changing the review 
period to four years. The abolition bill reneged on this intention. 
2. Ambiguity of who will conduct future reviews. 
The bill [73] did not specify which body would conduct future reviews that were currently the 
responsibility of the CCA, only mentioning this would be “at the direction of the minister”. The 
ambiguity surrounding ‘who’ would conduct the reviews is a direct cause of policy uncertainty. 
Given that the CCA provides non-partisan climate policy advice based on science, the 
indication that this role would be transferred to a minister, is equivalent to “removing an 
independent ‘umpire’” [73]. This was of particular significance at the time, given increasing 
signs as to a lack of impartiality within the current government. 
3. Removes the legislative reference to provide review commendations that require a 
government response. 
Removing these components of the review process, detracts from the purpose of a review, 
removes the certainty of a government response timeframe, and casts doubt on whether the 
government will respond at all. 
As seen in Table 4.6, although twice passed by the lower house, the bill failed to pass the senate 
and was last debated in July 2014. The legislation has since lapsed. The timeframe from the 
announcement of the proposed abolition in September 2013 through to the last debate, created 
almost a year of uncertainty surrounding the future of the agency, and highlighted issues 
associated with the ‘Duration of Change’. This extended period of uncertainty severely 
impacted upon the quality of the reviews carried out by the CCA, which had previously 
provided valuable information to stakeholders. This was perhaps unsurprising given the 
consequences on staffing, as highlighted in the 2013-2014 annual report [74]: 
 At this time Parliament is still considering the Authority’s fate but the organisation has 
already suffered serious damage; four of the Authority’s nine members have resigned and 
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the very talented secretariat assembled in its early days has declined by around two-thirds, 
to a dozen people in total.  
4.6 Long Term Strategic Outlook 
The governments long term strategic outlook for the renewables sector is an established 
indicator, playing an important role in both policy stability, and perceptions of policy stability.  
Investors place significant value on subtle signs of government intention, when evaluating 
conditions beyond those prescribed in legislation.  A RE investor surveyed by Bürer and 
Wüstenhagen [75] highlighted that, “experienced investors will ask if the overall direction of 
policy is good… The key thing about policy to stimulate their interest, however, is signal intent 
and consistency”. 
Here, we briefly consider two key indicators of government intent, specifically the Energy 
White Paper and government statements. 
4.6.1 Energy White Papers 
The Energy White Paper provides an “overview of the Australian Government’s vision for the 
energy sector, including the Government’s key priorities” [76]. Although not a legislated 
document, it gives investors and industry an indication of government direction.  In 2012 the 
Australian government released a 250-page report with a strong focus on renewable energy and 
climate change.  In stark contrast the 84-page White Paper of 2015 made only a single mention 
of ‘climate policy’ and ‘climate change’, and any references to renewable energy were mostly 
in respect to abolishing government agencies.  
The priorities in the 2012 white paper [24] were, “based on a clear vision of building a secure, 
resilient and efficient energy system that:  
 Provides accessible, reliable and competitively priced energy for all Australians. 
 Enhances Australia’s domestic and export growth potential. 
 Delivers clean and sustainable energy”. 
In contrast, priorities of the 2015 White Paper [76] were: 
 “Increasing competition to keep prices down. 
 Increasing energy productivity to promote growth. 
 Investing in Australia’s energy future”. 
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This 2015 paper was the first contemporary white paper which specifically neglected both 
climate change, and renewable energy, in such a significant way.  Indeed John Howards (liberal 
government) 2004 White Paper [35] had a significant focus on climate change, mentioning it 
numerous times throughout, and dedicating a whole chapter to the issue.  
4.6.2 Government Statements 
Public statements by government ministers, often heavily publicised by the media, provide the 
general public, investors and industry with information on policy decisions.  Pivotally, these 
announcements herald future direction, and in a similar way to reviews, can trigger uncertainty 
without an actual change occurring.  
An example of this was the timing of an announcement as previously discussed in Section 4.3.1, 
regarding the PVRP.  The market acted in response to the announcement, but delays in actual 
policy action led to a slump in sales, and consequent inability to meet demand once the program 
commencement date was brought forward. 
Another issue which can occur with government statements creating an environment of 
instability, is when aspects of policy on paper differ from what is said verbally.  An example of 
this was that on paper, and according to numerous government ministers, the 2013-2014 RET 
reduction was primarily in response to declining electricity demand.   After a senate agreement 
was reached however, Prime Minister Tony Abbott, told Sydney Radio Host Alan Jones, that 
windfarms were “visually awful” and, 
what we did recently in the Senate was to reduce, Alan, capital R-E-D-U-C-E, the 
number of these things [windfarms] that we are going to get in the future […] I frankly 
would have likely to have reduced the number a lot more […] what we are managing to 
do through this admittedly imperfect deal with the Senate is to reduce the growth rate 
of this particular sector. [77] 
These verbal statements indicated that the aim of the RET reduction, was clearly related to 
reducing growth in the wind sector.  This was in conflict with the ‘on-paper’ motives, and 
created uncertainty as to what the actual drivers were. Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s 
declared subjective reasoning behind a government decision is of significant concern not only 
to the wind sector, but for all industry. Decisions ostensibly made on the basis of personal 
opinion are more difficult to predict, and carry large implications for risk management.  
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Additionally, former treasurer Joe Hockey, previously described wind farms as “utterly 
offensive” [77], and Tony Abbott made headlines for telling a Victorian audience that “the 
climate change argument is absolute crap” [78]. The implications of these statements on 
investment was highlighted by Infigen CEO Miles George [79]: 
By saying that we should reduce the amount of wind farms for example, or that the RET is 
more than enough – those kind of signals, although they might be a little bit subtle, are 
considered by international investors as a sign that there is still not policy stability.  
4.7 Administrative Change 
Administrative changes have been one of the major challenges in compiling this analysis, and 
were wholly unexpected. Specifically, government stakeholder changes have proved a 
significant hindrance to accessing information. 
The Australian Government has been engaged in transitioning to the ‘digital age’, moving many 
of their services and other information online. The vast majority of this information, including 
all publications, legislation, press releases and the like, is published on the respective 
departmental websites. Large variations exist in the longevity of these departments, for example 
the current Department of Defence was established in 1942, and the current Department of 
Human Services was established in 2004. Conversely, the longevity of the departments 
responsible for varying aspects of RE, has been rather fickle, with one department in place for 
barely six months, as shown in Table 4.5. There has also been significant overlap and change 
between departmental responsibilities, in respect to RE. Particularly since all forms of the 
Department of Climate Change were dissolved in 2013, responsibilities have been 
interchanging between the Department of Environment and the Department of Industry.  
Table 4.5: Departmental Changes 
Dec 2007- Mar 2010 Department of Climate Change 
Mar 2010- Mar 2013 Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency 
Mar 2013- Sep 2013 Merged with the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and 
Tertiary Education to become the Department of Industry, Innovation, 
Climate Change, Science, Research and Tertiary Education 
Climate Change responsibilities divided amongst two departments: 
Sep 2013 – Jul 2016 Department of the 
Environment 
Sep 2013- Dec 2014 Department of Industry 
 
Jul 2016- current Department of the 
Environment and 
Energy 
 
Dec 2014- Sep 2015 Department of Industry 
and Science 
Sep 2015-current Department of Industry, 
Innovation and Science 
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Although the frequent renaming of a department may seem insignificant, it has a severe impact 
on the availability of information. Indeed, each time a department changes, the department 
website is altered or replaced completely, thus removing all information that was previously 
provided. For example, any link to information from the Department of Climate Change and 
Energy Efficiency (www.climatechange.com), now automatically directs to the homepage of 
the current Department of the Environment and Energy. Some of this information can still be 
accessed via various web archives, but not without limitations. These archives typically 
‘capture’ the information on limited days, include a disclaimer that the information is not up to 
date, and cannot be accessed user friendly targeted search engines like Google.com for example. 
It is also difficult to discern which archive is appropriate for use, dependent upon the 
information type i.e. press announcement, annual report, organisational structure, legal 
document. It is not only departmental changes that give rise to these problems but also changes 
in government agencies. Government agencies are often responsible for overseeing and 
reporting on various legislative schemes such as the RET.  When the responsibility for these 
reports changes, it is essentially necessary to research which agency was responsible in which 
year, before researching where to find the report for a specific year.  
Access to historical information is particularly important for emerging technologies like solar 
and wind. These technologies enter an already established market where they need to adapt in 
path-dependent ways to past policy and investment decisions. Simply put by Rio and Unreh 
[80], “history matters”. Thus, this aspect of administrative change, is not only a hindrance to 
academics but also has implications for industry. Given the influence of policy on renewable 
energy projects, it is vital that industry stakeholders have access to reliable information to 
predict and manage risk, and are not fully reliant on consultants.  
4.8 Summary of Important Events from 2013 to 2015 
Table 4.6 depicts key events contributing to an overall environment of policy instability in 
Australia from 2013 until 2015. Shaded cells show when a policy/institution were impacted. 
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Table 4.6: Summary of Important Events 
Date Event RET CPM CCA CEFC ARENA 
2013 
18 
Sep  
Coalition government takes office: 
 The government begins drafting legislation 
to repeal the Clean Energy Act 2011. 
 The CEFC is ordered to cease investments. 
 Plans to abolish the CCA are announced. 
     
13 
Nov  
 
A package of eleven CPM bills is introduced to 
the lower house, which include: 
 Repealing the CPM. 
 Abolishing the CEFC and CCA. 
 Reducing ARENA funding. 
     
21 
Nov  
All eleven CPM bills are passed by the lower 
house. 
     
2 
Dec  
All eleven CPM bills are introduced to senate. 
A motion is passed to consider the bills 
separately. 
     
10 
Dec  
The CEFC (abolition) Bill 2013 is negatived 
by the senate. 
     
2014 
17 
Feb  
An Independent Expert Review into the RET is 
commissioned and Mr. Dick Warburton is 
appointed to head the review. 
     
3 
Mar  
CCA (abolition) Bill 2013 is negatived by the 
senate. 
     
20 
Mar   
 
The remaining nine CPM bills are negatived 
by the senate. 
     
The CEFC (abolition) Bill 2013 [No.2] is 
introduced to the lower house. 
     
13 
May  
Budget 2014-15 is announced: 
 CCA receives no funding in 2014-15. 
 ARENA funding is reduced by $1.3 billion 
over five years. 
     
18 
Jun  
The CEFC (abolition) Bill 2013 [No.2] is 
negatived by the senate. 
     
19 
Jun  
The ARENA (repeal) Bill 2014 is introduced 
to the lower house. 
     
23 
Jun  
23 
Jun  
 
The CPM bills [No.2] are reintroduced to the 
lower house.  
     
The CCA (abolition) Bill 2013 [No.2] is 
introduced to lower house. 
     
A new CEFC (Abolition) Bill 2014 is 
introduced to lower house. 
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7  
Jul  
CCA (abolition) Bill 2013 [No.2] is introduced 
to the senate. 
     
10 
Jul  
The CPM bills [No.2] are negatived by the 
senate. 
     
14 
Jul  
New CPM bills 2014 are introduced and 
passed by the lower house.  
     
17 
Jul  
CPM bills 2014 are introduced and passed by 
the Senate, coming into effect on 1 July 2014. 
     
28 
Aug  
Warburton review is released to the public.      
1 
Sep  
ARENA (Repeal) Bill 2014 passed by the 
lower house and introduced to the senate the 
next day. 
     
22 
Oct  
Government proposes new LRET of 26,000 
GWh reduced from the current 41,000 GWh. 
     
24 
Nov  
Senate establishes the ‘Select Committee on 
Wind Turbines’. 
     
22 
Dec  
The CCA Review 2014 is released. It assesses 
the RET as effective and does not support 
scaling back the target. However, they do 
propose delaying the target increase due to 
lack of investor confidence.  
     
2015 
11 
Feb  
The NHMRC Statement: Evidence on Wind 
Farms and Human Health’, concludes there is 
no consistent evidence that wind farms cause 
adverse health effects in humans. 
     
2 
Mar  
Revised large-scale RET target of 31,000 GWh 
is proposed, but rejected by the opposition. 
     
8 
May  
RET is announced as 33,000 GWh, or 23.5%, 
of the estimated electricity generation for 
2020.  
     
23 
Jun  
New RET passes the senate.      
3 
Aug  
‘Select Committee on Wind Turbines’ tables 
final report and formally ceases to exist. 
     
7 
Aug  
Government responds to the CCA 2014 RET 
Review. 
     
9  
Oct  
Wind farm commissioner is appointed & an 
Independent Scientific Committee on Wind 
Turbines is appointed responsible for building 
on the work of NHMRC.  
     
 
  
58 
 
5 POLICY INSTABILITY: EMPLOYMENT AND INVESTMENT 
Section 4 examined the consequences of policy instability on investment in relation to specific 
Australian policy. This section in turn, aims to briefly address the overall impact of policy 
instability on two key areas, namely renewables employment and investment. 
5.1 Employment 
Direct full time equivalent employment in RE activities from 2009-2015 in Australia is shown 
in Figure 5.1. These values were estimated by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) [81] 
using information from the Renewable Energy Certificate Registry, publicly available industry 
reports and an employment factor based on installed capacity. Employment activities are 
defined as those, “principally motivated by the production of renewable energy, and/or by the 
design, construction and/or operation and maintenance of renewable energy infrastructure” 
[81]. Employment by energy type varies by state, but overall rooftop PV (including hot water 
systems) has been the main source of employment since 2009, representing 53% of employment 
in 2014-2015, a decrease from 75% in 2011-2012. This is consistent with worldwide 
employment trends, where Solar PV is the predominant provider of employment [82].  Policy 
changes are reflected in Figure 5.1 which shows employment increasing with the introduction 
of state FiT schemes, the increased RET and CPM, then decreasing after the September 2013 
election and ensuing abolishment, reduction and repeal of respective policies. 
 
Figure 5.1: Direct Employment in Renewable Energy Activities in Australia from 2009-2015 [81] 
The importance of policy stability for employment has been highlighted in literature, with the 
ABS noting government policy as the key influence on employment and the International 
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Renewable Energy Agency’s (IRENA) Renewable Energy and Jobs Annual Review [82], 
stating that, “meeting the increasing labour requirements of the renewable energy sector will 
require stable and predictable policy frameworks”.  
Ramifications on employment extend beyond the cause and effect of policy instability causing 
reductions in investment, and consequent flow on effects reducing employment opportunities. 
A prime example being the abrupt cessation of the PVRP and consequent excess in applications 
discussed in Section 4.3.1 When the strain on government staff resources not only led to 
approval delays but also reduced the capacity for the government to fulfil its duties in regulating 
quality standards. Attention should also be given to the residual effects, of a boom and bust 
cycle. For example, projects and businesses that do survive a bust phase, may have lost valuable 
components of their manufacturing and supply chains, thus incurring significant delays and 
restructuring costs.  
5.2  Investment 
Three key consequences of policy instability for investment will be discussed. Firstly, 
instability increases perceived investment risk and hence project costs. Secondly, policy 
instability has become so important for investors that it is skewing the assessment of policy 
design. Finally, it may ‘freeze’ investment by giving rise to benefits achieved from waiting for 
a more certain policy environment. 
5.2.1 Project Cost 
The cost of electricity generation, generally comprises three components: 
1. Capital and Investment Costs. 
2. Operation and Maintenance costs. 
3. Fuel Costs. 
RE projects generally have no fuel costs, low operation and maintenance costs, and high capital 
and investment costs. This structure is considered quite risky from the perspective of an investor 
who is consequently providing a large amount of finance without a guaranteed return.  When 
investors perceive a project to be ‘risky’ they will generally increase the cost of making capital 
available, in order to compensate for presumed risks. As the cost of capital must be paid for 
from project revenues, perceived risk can directly disrupt the financial structure of a project.  
Depending on how it is perceived by investors, policy instability represents a huge risk that 
cannot be easily managed. Consequently, the greater the degree of perceived instability, the 
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greater the cost of capital. This is of particular significance for RE projects, which as previously 
mentioned are already highly capital intensive. To investigate this issue, Noothout et al. [83] 
examined financial indicators in European Union (EU) Member States for onshore wind 
projects in 2014, and found they varied significantly: 
 Weighted Average Cost of Capital varied from 3.5% in Germany to 12% in Greece. 
 The cost of equity varied from 6% in Germany to more than 15% in Estonia, Greece, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia. 
 The cost of debt varied from 1.8% in Germany to 12.6% in Greece. 
In combination with investor surveys, the study [83] found:  
The level of cost of equity is often influenced by risk perception of investors. In 
countries such as Germany where renewable energy policy is anchored in the renewable 
energy act, approved by law, and proved to be very reliable and credible over a long 
time period, the cost of equity is low. In economically and politically less stable 
countries where renewable energy is not yet mainstream or embedded in a reliable 
support policy, the cost of equity is higher.  
The study [83] found that policy design was the most  critical issue, as it directly determines 
“the level of certainty for project developers”.  Sudden policy change was a critical factor 
mainly for Eastern European nations including the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary and 
Slovenia. The only nation to cite this issue as the number one most critical factor was the Czech 
Republic. This was attributed to a PV boom which led the Government to blame increasing 
electricity prices on renewable energy, and to a government aiming “to stop the development 
of the sector completely” [83]. These mentions mirror the comments made by former Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott (see Section 4.6.2) highlighting his aim to stop growth in the RE sector.  
Noothout et al. [83] also noted that the risk of sudden policy change was highest in countries 
where on-shore wind was nascent, and that it may be a key reason why nascent markets fail to 
become ‘emerging markets’. 
5.2.2 The Influence on Policy Design 
Policy stability has become such a key focus for investors that it is in danger of skewing the 
assessment of policy effectiveness. Even policies which are not particularly effective in 
achieving their objectives, but which are implemented with consistency, have set returns, and 
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minimal uncertainty, are perceived as ‘more effective’ by investors.  While a policy which in 
theory would be more effective, can be perceived as ‘less effective’, if it is poorly implemented.  
Investor surveys conducted by Bürer and Wüstenhagen [75] found that the majority of the 
investors they interviewed mentioned “the importance of policy consistency” and that although 
they asked participants to independently rate policy designs, there was significant bias due to 
“the tendency of investors to base their assessment of policies on their experience with a 
specific application of this policy in one or just a few countries”.  From the context of 
interviews, they found the “stop and go” application of the US tax production credits created 
negative bias for this generic policy type. While the positive results for the generic ‘feed-in-
tariff’ although positive overall, were more favoured by European participants, and associated 
with the perceived overall stable policy environment in Germany. Indeed, participants’ 
comments linked their perception of policy effectiveness with both a specific nation, as well as 
the manner in which it was implemented [75]. 
This has particularly serious consequences in the long term, as a government can effectively 
‘taint’ the reputation of an effective policy, essentially giving them the power to make or break 
a policy depending on how well it is implemented. It also severely restricts future policy design, 
as even very effective aspects of a ‘tainted’ policy, can become off-limits through association.  
5.2.3 The Value of Waiting 
A key investment consideration is in regard to the timing of an investment. Dixit [84] identified 
three features common to most investment decisions, and the corresponding situations where 
waiting to invest would have positive value: 
1. A component of the investment is sunk and cannot be recouped at a later date. 
2. The investment opportunity will not disappear; it does not need to be taken immediately. 
3. The investment environment is uncertain, and information arrives slowly. 
Applying the first two situations to large-scale wind and solar projects. The first will almost 
always be true. For example, money invested in consultants to perform feasibility analyses, 
costs to fulfil regulatory requirements, and installation costs, are all major cost components that 
cannot be recouped. The second situation is mostly true as natural resources such as wind and 
solar radiation are unlikely to disappear.  ‘Ideal’ sites with resource availability as a key 
constraint can be procured but not necessarily developed, however this is not as pressing an 
issue for resource-rich nations like Australia. Other features of an ideal site like grid proximity, 
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favourable state regulatory requirements, and positive public acceptance, are not unique and 
could well become more prevalent in the future. 
Although this presents a simplified decision making matrix, and instances may occur where the 
first two situations are not true, it highlights the dependency of RE projects on the investment 
environment. RE projects are not a unique patented product, if policy instability is present in 
one location, prospective investors can seek another location which is more favourable, or 
choose to wait and then invest when the environment is more favourable. These considerations 
are largely why the 88% drop in large-scale investment from 2013-2014 in Australia, was 
attributed to policy uncertainty.  
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6 RENEWABLE ENERGY IN OECD MEMBER STATES AND 
CHINA 
6.1 Motivation for International Policy Analysis 
In order to provide comprehensive recommendations for industry to manage policy instability, 
the issue of policy instability will be examined on an international scale. The RE policy 
environment can vary significantly by nation due to differences in resource variety and 
abundance, as well as with differences in the energy mix with fossil fuel resources. Thus, an 
international examination can serve to identify different management avenues by realising the 
successes and failures of the international community.  In previous sections the detrimental 
effects of policy stability on the uptake of RE was highlighted.  In this section we consider 
international successes and failures, in terms of various countries uptake of renewable energy.  
Also discussed are the particular aspects which have contributed to the unstable policy 
environment in Australia, including: 
 Public opinion. 
 Policy design. 
 Policy interactions. 
 Accuracy of engineering models. 
 Stakeholder involvement/interactions (e.g. Industry involvement in the legislative 
process). 
 Political environment. 
As investigating each individual nation is beyond the scope of this discussion, a method was 
developed to identify countries who’s RE policy would most likely provide the most relevant 
information, in the context of the above points. 
The first step was to limit the analysis to countries with comparable policy environments to 
Australia.  Specifically, the 34 democracies with market economies whose governments are 
members of the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development).  OECD 
member nations include both advanced countries, and emerging countries such as Mexico and 
Chile [85], with a wide geographic spread across all continents except Africa and Antarctica. 
The People’s Republic of China was also included, although it is not an OECD member, as it 
represents the nation with the largest population, as well as the largest installed renewable and 
total electricity, generation capacity.  
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It can be reasonably assumed that the existence of RE policy, and hence policy instability, 
depends on the existence of an energy resource.  Therefore, a limiting factor discussed in this 
investigation is a countries resource potential.  Further, it was previously identified that policy 
instability can detract from the effectiveness of a policy.  Thus, to best fulfil the purpose of 
identifying successes and failures, a literature review was conducted of current indicators used 
to measure the effectiveness of RE policy. It was found that ignoring the limiting factor is a 
significant weakness of many simple indicators. For example, indicators like the ‘Total Installed 
Capacity (MW)’ or ‘Total Electricity Generated (GWh)’ are often greater in larger and/or 
resource-rich countries.  Such indicators which measure the degree to which a government 
meets their own pre-existing targets, is analogous to allowing university students to grade 
themselves against an examination mark of their own choosing.  It was noted that the more 
complex indicators do incorporate the limiting factor, some of these are described in Table 6.1. 
Unfortunately these indicators are designed to measure only a ‘snapshot’ of effectiveness over 
a short specified time frame [86, 87], and thus don’t provide information about the long-term 
policy environment. 
Table 6.1: Complex Indicators of Policy Effectiveness [86] 
Indicators Description  Formula (If Applicable) 
European 
Commission’s 
effectiveness 
indicator 
“Measures deployment 
achieved in a given year as a 
percentage of remaining 
unexploited realisable 
potential to 2020” 
𝐸𝑛
𝑖 =
𝐺𝑛
𝑖 − 𝐺𝑛−1
𝑖
𝑃𝑂𝑇2020
𝑖 − 𝐺𝑛−1
𝑖
 
 
𝐸𝑛
𝑖 = Effectiveness indicator for RE technology i 
for the year n 
𝐺𝑛
𝑖 = Electricity generation by RE technology i 
in year n 
𝑃𝑂𝑇2020
𝑖 = Total generation potential of RE 
technology i until 2020 
Policy Impact 
Indicator 
An adaptation of the effective 
indicator wherein progress is 
instead “measured toward the 
IEA World Energy Outlook 
2010 450 projections for 
2030, from the base year of 
2005” 
𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑛
𝑖 =
𝐺𝑛
𝑖 − 𝐺𝑛−1
𝑖
𝑊𝐸𝑂2030
𝑖 − 𝐺2005
𝑖
 
𝑊𝐸𝑂2030
𝑖 =WEO 450 generation projections for 
2030 of RE technology i 
Deployment 
indicator 
“Quantifies maturity of national RET markets. Composite indicator combining: 
RET production as share of consumption; production as share of 2030 realisable 
potential; and installed capacity” 
To identify nations whose long term policy may be relevant, the indicator for ‘Total Electricity 
Generated (GWh)’ was adapted and four categories were defined (Table 6.2). A nation falls 
into each category dependent upon the total resource potential and the current figure of 
electricity generation from that resource. The nations with the highest resource utilisation (i.e. 
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low potential but high actual use) are anticipated to have the highest likelihood of providing 
relevant information, as their policy has possibly been the most effective in light of a limited 
resource base. 
Table 6.2: Country Categories 
Category Criteria Likelihood of providing relevant information 
A 
High Potential Resources and High 
Actual Use 
Unlikely 
B 
High Potential Resources and Low 
Actual Use 
Likely 
C 
Low Potential Resources and High 
Actual Use 
Very likely 
D 
Low Potential Resources and Low 
Actual Use 
Very unlikely 
6.2 Current Electricity Generation Outlook 
Data for the worlds current electricity generation was collected from the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) “World - Renewables and Waste Energy Supply” dataset [88].  The IEA defines 
electricity generation via the following formula, 
𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑦 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝐺𝑊ℎ)
= 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
− 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
The most recent available OECD data is for 2014, while that for China is from 2013. All values 
were extracted directly from the dataset.  IEA definitions for each technology, as well as country 
specific data information is described in the ‘Database Documentation’ [89] for which a link is 
provided in the references. To provide context, all renewable energy resources have been 
included in the final results depicted in Table 6.3.  
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Table 6.3: Electricity Generated (GWh) [88] 
Country Hydro 
Geo-
therma
l 
PV CSP 
Tide, 
Wave 
and 
Ocean 
Wind 
Renewable 
Municipal 
Waste 
Biofuel Total RE 
Total 
ALL 
Energy 
% 
RE 
Australia 18490 1 4854 4 0 10068 0 3452 36869 248183 15 
Austria 41002 0 746 0 0 3846 285 4101 49980 61555 81 
Belgium 303 0 3084 0 0 4568 572 3823 12350 71281 17 
Canada 378749 0 382 0 16 11400 146 5102 395795 639419 62 
Chile 24237 0 170 5 0 1439 0 5914 31765 76655 41 
P.R of China 909234 109 15451 26 8 139300 0 38300 1102428 5422163 20 
Czech 
Republic 
1953 0 2122 0 0 477 88 4573 9213 85100 11 
Denmark 15 0 596 0 0 13079 891 3357 17938 31905 56 
Estonia 27 0 0 0 0 604 0 739 1370 12444 11 
Finland 13371 0 6 0 0 1113 430 10869 25789 68032 38 
France 60944 0 5861 0 524 16979 1923 3265 89496 557211 16 
Germany 19586 110 34931 0 0 55970 6133 42997 159727 608756 26 
Greece 4462 0 3768 0 0 3621 0 179 12030 47581 25 
Hungary 301 0 56 0 0 657 137 1958 3109 29288 11 
Iceland 12873 5239 0 0 0 8 0 0 18120 18122 
10
0 
Ireland 709 0 0 0 0 5136 68 426 6339 25971 24 
Israel 33 0 780 0 0 6 0 84 903 57077 2 
Italy 57025 5894 23694 0 0 15052 2168 14043 117876 276207 43 
Japan 81929 2580 24388 0 0 5008 3018 31902 148825 1019993 15 
R. of Korea 3964 0 1605 0 500 1165 133 1002 8369 541287 2 
Luxembourg 107 0 74 0 0 73 39 95 388 1872 21 
Mexico 38893 6000 219 0 0 6234 0 952 52298 300448 17 
Netherlands 112 0 724 0 0 5806 1890 3107 11639 102507 11 
New Zealand 24335 7258 17 0 0 2210 0 628 34448 43541 79 
Norway 135916 0 0 0 0 2216 175 26 138333 141607 98 
Poland 2172 0 7 0 0 7673 0 9984 19836 158457 13 
Portugal 15612 201 630 0 0 12103 268 2789 31603 52043 61 
Slovakia 4244 0 625 0 0 6 18 756 5649 26515 21 
Slovenia 6092 0 257 0 0 4 0 259 6612 17160 39 
Spain 39084 0 8925 4728 0 52262 600 4348 109947 273923 40 
Sweden 64385 0 64 0 0 11475 701 8112 84737 154125 55 
Switzerland 38036 0 636 0 0 108 977 551 40308 69824 58 
Turkey 40396 2250 0 0 0 8385 0 984 52015 250435 21 
United 
Kingdom 
5929 0 3931 0 3 31615 2258 20666 64402 332179 19 
United States 
of America 
260905 18385 22500 1557 0 184137 8374 60709 556567 4310921 13 
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6.3 Potential Resources  
6.3.1 Scope of Methodology 
When considering the availability of an RE resource, a type of ‘potential’ must be defined. This 
definition varies throughout current literature, and that used in this context is outlined by Figure 
6.1. It can be noted that from left to right, the resource potential decreases as measurement 
complexity increases. For the current investigation, the theoretical potential is too unrealistic to 
be of value, while the complexities of the economic and market potential are beyond scope. It 
follows then that the ‘resource potential’ is most appropriately defined by the ‘technical 
potential’. 
 
Figure 6.1: Types of 'Potential' 
The measurement of any type of potential can be of use.  However due to the complexity of the 
considerations and assumptions, there is significant methodology discrepancy in current 
literature.  This discrepancy exists to the extent that numerous papers are wholly dedicated to 
reviewing different models.  
6.3.2 Wind 
Potential onshore and offshore wind supply data was based on a resource assessment performed 
by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL).  It was based on the National Center 
for Atmospheric Research ‘Climate Four-Dimensional Data Assimilation’ (CFDDA) 
mesoscale climate database. This CFDDA database contains hourly wind velocity vectors on a 
40 km grid, at multiple heights above ground level. For each grid cell, hourly wind speed 
distributions at 90 m hub heights were determined, and a gross capacity factor was computed 
Theoretical Potential
Maximum Achievable 
potential. Limitations 
include natural and 
climatic factors and 
energy content of 
resource
Technical Potential
Limitations due to 
technical system 
requirements include 
topography and land 
use requirements, 
conversion 
efficiencies, 
availability of suitable 
materials etc.
Economic Potential
Constrained by 
projected fuel and 
technology costs, eg. 
construction, 
materials, 
maintenance and 
running costs etc.
Market Potential
Impacted by 
competion with other 
resources, investor 
response, regulatory 
framework, policy 
implementation, 
subsidies etc. 
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through convolution with a representative power curve. Output was derated for outages and 
wake losses, to obtain the net capacity factor [90]. 
Onshore wind data was further classified by distance to the nearest power plant or large load, 
and was based on a composite IEC Class II turbine. Offshore data was further classified by 
distance to shore and water depth, and was based on an IEC Class I turbine. A wind turbine 
density of 5 MW/km2 was assumed [90]. 
In terms of land use constraints, protected, urban, and high-elevation areas were fully excluded, 
and certain land cover types were fractionally excluded. Marine areas were assigned to each 
country based on exclusive economic zones; unassigned or disputed areas were excluded [90]. 
Additional exclusions from the collected data were also made. For the offshore wind potential, 
distances to shore farther than 20 nautical miles, as well as water depths below 60 m were 
excluded due to increased technical constraints. Wind capacity factors below 18% were 
excluded as they are not on par with the lowest regional averages of around 20% for 
China/India, or the global average of around 28% [91]. These exclusions are represented by 
strike-out values in . 
Table 6.4 and Table 6.5. The summation of both the onshore and offshore values for each 
country is depicted in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.4: Wind Potential Classifications 
 Onshore, distance to load Offshore, distance to shore Offshore, water depth 
near 0-50 miles 5-20 nautical miles shallow 0-30m 
transitional 50-100 miles 20-50 nautical miles transitional 30-60m 
far 100-5000 miles 50-100 nautical miles deep 60-1000m 
Table 6.5: Wind Potential Capacity Factors 
Wind Classes Capacity Factor (%) 
c1 18 
c2 18-22 
c3 22-26 
c4 26-30 
c5 30-34 
c6 34-38 
c7 38-42 
c8 42-46 
c9 46-100 
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6.3.3 Solar Photovoltaic Technology 
The majority of PV collectors are flat-plate collectors which convert Global Horizontal 
Irradiance (GHI) into electricity. GHI is calculated from the Diffuse Horizontal Irradiance 
(DHI) from the sky, and the Direct Normal Irradiance (DNI) via equation 1, where Z is the 
sun’s zenith angle at any instant. 
𝐺𝐻𝐼 = 𝐷𝑁𝐼 + 𝐷𝑁𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑍    (1) 
For cost-benefit reasons, most PV collectors are placed at a fixed tilted angle, specifically at an 
angle approximately equal to the site’s latitude, oriented towards the equator, which yields the 
maximum yearly solar radiation [92]. The total Global Tilt Irradiance (GTI) can be calculated 
via equation 2. 
𝐺𝑇𝐼 = 𝐷𝑁𝐼 ∗ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝛽 + 𝐷𝐻𝐼 ∗ 𝑅𝑑 + 𝐺𝐻𝐼 ∗ 𝑅𝑟𝜌  (2) 
Where 𝛽 is the angle of incidence of the sun rays on the tilted plane, 𝑅𝑑 is the diffuse 
transposition factor, ρ is the surface relativity or albedo and 𝑅𝑟 is the transposition factor for 
ground reflection [93].  𝑅𝑑 and 𝑅𝑟 were calculated using the Perez Model [94].  
Potential estimates were obtained from the best available solar resource data available to the 
NREL. In some cases, where high resolution data was not available, data from NASA’s Surface 
Meteorology and Solar Energy version 6 database was used. Resolution varies spatially from 1 
km to 1 degree (approx. 10 0km) and high spatial resolution datasets (1 km to 40 km cells) were 
modelled to support country or regional projects. The data represents the total potential solar 
energy as a function of land area per solar class (kWh/m²/day). Each solar class correlates to a 
specific 0.5 kWh/m²/day range. Final values were averaged from data collected between 1961 
and 2008. The equation for the total average annual potential follows [95]. 2  
𝐸𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 = 1.5% 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∗ kWh m2⁄ day⁄ ∗ 365 days ∗ 10% 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦   2         (3) 
The total potential global irradiance data for collectors tilted at latitude is depicted in Table 6.7 
of Section 5.3.5. In order to reflect reasonable global averages, resource classes with an average 
value less than 3 kWh/m²/day were excluded. 
  
                                                 
2 Also applicable to CSP data in 5.3.4 
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6.3.4 Concentrating Solar Power  
The data for CSP resource potential was collected from the same source as for Solar PV 
potential, thus the information denoted by the footnote is also applicable here. Using the NREL 
Systems Model Advisor, the capacity factors were calculated for a CSP Parabolic trough with 
a solar multiple of 2 and 6 hour storage [95]. In order to reasonably reflect global averages, 
resources below class 4 were not included in the total, and are represented as strike-outs in 
Table 6.6 which depicts the different capacity factors per class. The total potential DNI is 
depicted in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.6: Concentrating Solar Power Potential Capacity Factors 
kWh/m^2/day Class Capacity Factor (%) 
<= 3 1 12.0309 
3 - 3.5 2 15.5200 
3.5 - 4 3 17.9165 
4 - 4.5 4 21.2944 
4.5 - 5 5 24.6550 
5 - 6.25 6 29.2016 
6.25 - 7.25 7 36.7112 
7.25 - 7.5 8 41.2283 
7.5 - 7.75 9 42.1525 
> 7.75 10 43.4375 
6.3.5 Comparison of Resource Utilisation 
The final values for potential electricity generation are compared with the actual electricity 
generated for each resource as depicted in Table 6.7. Comparative plots were then constructed 
as per Figure 6.2 to Figure 6.4. 
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Table 6.7: Technology Comparison 
Country Wind (TWh) PV (TWh) CSP (TWh) 
Actual 
Electricity 
Generated 
Potential 
Electricity 
Generation 
Actual 
Electricity 
Generated 
Potential 
Electricity 
Generation 
Actual 
Electricity 
Generated 
Potential 
Electricity 
Generation 
Australia 10.07 68280 4.854 25,098 0.004 74,127,508 
Austria 3.85 313 0.746 172 0 559,996 
Belgium 4.57 205 3.084 36 0 1,649 
Canada 11.40 14284 0.382 20,940 0 733,220 
Chile 1.44 1673 0.170 1,792 0.005 4,903,108 
China 139.30 22575 15.451 27,374 0.026 26,694,153 
Czech Rep. 0.48 366 2.122 138 0 202,487 
Denmark 13.08 751 0.596 69 0 199,312 
Estonia 0.60 156 0.000 79 0 255,132 
Finland 1.11 891 0.006 116 0 1,525,588 
France 16.98 3353 5.861 1,183 0 3,956,955 
Germany 55.97 1496 34.931 539 0 852,500 
Greece 3.62 462 3.768 315 0 1,019,151 
Hungary 0.66 283 0.056 193 0 648,109 
Iceland 0.01 821 0.000 0 0 27,129 
Ireland 5.14 870 0.000 51 0 36,461 
Israel 0.01 5 0.780 75 0 190,775 
Italy 15.05 824 23.694 752 0 2,564,630 
Japan 5.01 1113 24.388 809 0 392,757 
R. of Korea 1.17 510 1.605 251 0 11,573 
Luxembourg 0.07 15 0.074 4 0 4,436 
Mexico 6.23 4203 0.219 6,469 0 16,738,186 
Netherlands 5.81 379 0.724 43 0 20,162 
Norway 2.22 1427 0.017 593 0 630,671 
NZ 2.21 2079 0.000 5 0 166,470 
Poland 7.67 1855 0.007 546 0 1,243,378 
Portugal 12.10 442 0.630 254 0 930,681 
Slovakia 0.01 157 0.625 94 0 295,799 
Slovenia 0.00 16 0.257 42 0 138,469 
Spain 52.26 2231 8.925 1,377 4.728 4,880,841 
Sweden 11.48 1276 0.064 173 0 1,968,017 
Switzerland 0.11 122 0.636 91 0 298,383 
Turkey 8.39 3060 0.000 2,208 0 4,976,286 
UK 31.62 2594 3.931 191 0 214,846 
USA 184.14 34275 22.500 22,991 1.557 45,822,952 
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The category boundaries (and hence the axis locations) for the Potential Generation were taken 
at the average value. For wind, the Actual Generation boundary was also taken at the average, 
however for Solar PV and CSP it was taken at half the maximum value to better reflect the data. 
Figure 6.4 for CSP is evidently the least informative plot as only five nations use CSP for their 
current electricity generation. Despite not being perfectly suited to the comparative method 
used, it does fulfil the original requirements by visualising nations with disproportionate 
utilisation. From the comparative plots it is evident that a few large countries have very high 
potential resources as predicted, however their actual generation is often on par or below 
resource poor nations. Thus the method clearly identifies nations whose potential generation is 
disproportionate to their actual generation, and so these countries are most likely to provide 
simplistic indicators. 
It is important to note that the use of the ‘technical potential’ provides a very simplified version 
of results. However, as previously discussed, higher accuracy is beyond the scope and 
requirements of this investigation, wherein results are merely used as a guide to identify 
possible nations whose policy is relevant for further discussion. 
The nations in each category for all three resources are depicted in Table 6.8. As the most 
prevalent nations in category C, Germany and Spain were identified for further analysis. 
Table 6.8: Resultant Categories 
 A B C D 
High Potential/High 
actual use 
High potential/low 
actual use 
Low potential/high 
actual 
Low potential/low 
actual 
Wind China, USA Australia, Canada Germany, Spain, UK 
All remaining 
nations 
Solar 
PV 
USA 
Australia, Canada, 
China 
Germany, Italy, 
Japan 
All remaining 
nations 
CSP N/A 
Australia, China, 
USA, Mexico 
Spain 
All remaining 
nations 
6.4 Policy Analysis: Germany 
The purpose of this international analysis is to provide recommendations for industry to manage 
policy instability. In this respect a literature review was conducted into the uptake of renewable 
energy in Germany. Relevant aspects of this follow, with a main focus on barriers to the initial 
diffusion of RE in Germany prior to 2005.  
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6.4.1 Relevant Background Information 
6.4.1.1 The Period from 1970-1988 
The years from 1970-1988 set the stage for the future diffusion of RE in Germany. Three key 
aspects of which follow: 
1. The rise of environmental groups and the decline of nuclear power. 
The Energy Crisis of the 1970’s, led the government to focus on support for coal and nuclear 
energy. However, growing environmental concerns were becoming widespread, and there was 
strong public opinion against issues such as acid rain and nuclear waste management. From the 
mid to late 1970’s, support for nuclear power declined as a result of minor incidents at German 
Nuclear power plants [96], prompting the government to establish an Enquete Commission on 
‘Future Nuclear Energy Policy’ passed by the German parliament in 1980. An Enquet 
Commission is comprised of half lower house MP’s, and half experts with voting rights. It is 
set up on an ‘as needs basis’ to deal with policy decisions requiring technical or scientific 
expertise. The commission concluded with a majority decision, that an increase in nuclear 
capacity would not be required, given the uptake of ‘energy efficiency measures’ and the 
availability of alternate energy sources. The presence of environmental groups and 
environmental concerns continued to grow in the 1980’s, with the Green Party winning almost 
6% of votes in the 1983 national election. Although, public support for nuclear was divided at 
this point, the three major political parties were all pro-nuclear, representing over 94% of seats 
in parliament. However, this changed with the Chernobyl incident in 1986. Chernobyl had a 
profound impact on the support for nuclear energy in Germany, with the nation experiencing 
increased levels of radiation due to the incident. For the first time opinion polls found that the 
vast majority of Germans approved the phase out of nuclear energy. Consequently, the Social 
Democratic Party (SPD), one of the three major political parties, altered their stance from pro-
nuclear, to anti-nuclear. 
2. Hostile political and electricity supply structure. 
The German electricity supply structure was predominantly hostile to the uptake of renewables.  
It was dominated by large utilities with a reliance on nuclear and coal generation.  They opposed 
smaller decentralised forms of electricity generation, which they considered foreign to the 
system. There was also little political support for renewables from the two key ministries, 
‘Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy’ (BMWi) and the ‘Federal Ministry for 
Research and Technology’. Indeed, the former is in charge of electricity utilities, while the latter 
saw its responsibility lying only in pre-development stages and/or research [97].  Prior to the 
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Chernobyl incident all three major parties were focused on coal and nuclear, with the 
government introducing an electricity tax in 1975 to incentivise the use of otherwise 
uncompetitive generation from domestic coal [98]. 
3. R&D instigated institutional change 
Largely due to increasing public pressure, the German Government introduced a renewables 
R&D program in 1974. The aim of the program was to encourage the ‘creation of knowledge’ 
and was achieved by offering finance options to as wide a range of participants as possible, 
including corporations, universities, research institutions and businesses [99]. The program was 
large and flexible enough to finance the majority of projects which applied to it.  The result was 
that grants were made available to around forty research projects from academic organisations 
and industry for the development of wind turbines in the 10 kW-400 kW range, through until 
1989 [97].  Similarly for Solar PV, around 18 universities, 39 firms, and 12 research institutes 
received funding [97]. Another set of demonstration programmes also provided funding to more 
than 14 German suppliers of wind turbines. Although these programs didn’t significantly 
contribute to installed capacity, they instigated a ‘fringe’ body of academic and industrial 
knowledge, and opened smaller niche markets. Most importantly they triggered the creation of 
many organisations which became key advocacy actors.  
6.4.1.2 The Period from 1988-1998 
In the late 80’s an Enquete Commission on Climate Change recommended a large reduction in 
CO2 emissions, and advocated a fundamental reform of the nation’s energy policy [96]. 
Consequently, several parliamentary policy proposals were submitted, including a Feed-in 
Tariff law, which emphasised the increased support for RE within parliament. However, 
opposition was still present in the ruling Government, and the previously mentioned BMWi 
attempted to persuade conservative parliamentarians against such policies in the future [96].  In 
the early 1990’s, in order to placate the growing number of RE supporters from both within and 
outside parliament, the Ministry of Research introduced both a modest capital subsidy program 
for 1000 solar homes, and a production subsidy for wind power generation. 
Germany’s first major renewable energy policy came into effect on the 1st January 1991, the 
Electricity Feed-In Act (Stromeinspungsgesetz (StrEG)), which required utilities to pay for RE 
based on a percentage of the average end-user/customer tariff [98]. The law was put forward 
by an unlikely coalition formed between conservative backbenchers (predominantly farmers) 
who supported small hydropower, the opposition Green and SPD parties who favoured wind 
energy, and in addition the aforementioned advocacy organisations [96, 97].  Surprisingly the 
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law was adopted in an all-party consensus with opposition from the BMWi, but overall 
seemingly little political effort [97]. This is attributed to the fact that the policy was originally 
only conceived for a few hundred MW of small-scale hydropower, and therefore 
underestimated by the large utilities, who were at the time preoccupied with the process of 
establishing themselves in the recently reunified East Germany [96, 97]. 
However, as the StrEG began to promote the uptake of wind and small hydro, and the 
unification process settled, opposition legal challenges against the StrEG began. Three key legal 
challenges follow: 
 1996: Association of German Electrical Utilities (Verband der Elektrizitaetswirschaft 
(VDEW)) lodges a complaint to the European Commission, Directorate General for 
Competition, alleging the StrEG violated state aid rules. 
 1996: With support from the Directorate General Competition, a reduction in the feed-
in-tariffs is proposed by BMWi. 
 1998: Large German utility PreussenElektra, challenges the StrEG on the same legal 
basis as VDEW. This involves EU law and is transferred to the European Court of 
Justice, eliminating any chance of a quick resolution. 
These challenges created an environment of uncertainty and are attributed to reducing 
investment in the sector. However, they also prompted large campaigns from a diverse coalition 
of supporters who were growing as the economic benefits of the developing sector began 
impacting a larger audience. And now included: 
 Political parties (the Greens and the SPD). 
 Traditional farmers and their conservative political members. 
 RE associations. 
 Labor unions. 
 Industry associations such as the German Mechanical Engineering Industry Association 
(Verband Deutscher Maschinen und Anlagenbauer), one of the most influential, and 
currently largest industry association in Europe. 
 Researchers from public and private institutions. 
 Small to medium businesses. 
 Some bureaucrats. 
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Yet, even with this support, the sector was not immune to opposition. For example, the BMWi 
was successful in reforming EU Law, consequently diluting the German feed-in-tariff [96].  
It is not clear if these campaigns would have been successful against continued opposition from 
the government, as the 1998 election brought with it a new government. 
6.4.1.3 The Period from 1998 Onwards 
In 1998 a SPD/Greens coalition was elected into Government, they introduced ambitious targets 
and several RE targeted policies, but most importantly they reformed the StrEG replacing it 
with the Renewable Energy Act of 2000 (Erneubare Energie Gesetz (EEG)) [96]. The EEG 
resolved many of the previous issues, associated with the StrEG, particularly in terms of 
stability: 
Table 6.9: Comparison of Germany's Renewable Energy Laws 
Electricity Feed-in Act (Stromeinspungsgesetz) Renewable Energy Act (Erneubare Energie 
Gesetz 
Didn’t share financial burden amongst utilities. 
Northern and southern utilities ended up 
absorbing majority of cost. Leading to their 
strong opposition. 
Spread costs over all utilities, thus avoiding 
future legal challenges such as those brought 
forward by large utility PreussenElektra. 
Didn’t support Solar PV. FiT rates were defined 
as a percentage of average end customer tariffs 
that gave no security for investors. 
Introduced fixed tariffs depending on source, 
size, and location. Twenty-year duration. 
 Introduced a four-year review period, with the 
purpose of maintaining the policy in tune with 
current technology. 
However, the EEG was not passed with ease, considering the opposition from the utilities and 
BMWi (now under new government leadership but still heavily influenced by the utilities) [96]. 
The keys to its success included: 
 Strong support in parliament. 
 Strong public support and increasing industry support from engineering firms. 
 Divided conservatives (mostly due to pro-RE conservative farmers). 
 The EEG was technically only a reform of the StrEG, and not a new policy which would 
have invoked significant political discourse. 
Even under the pro-renewables SPD/Greens government, the renewables sector was not free of 
instability, yet these were handled very effectively, with some examples as follows: 
 The solar 100,000 roof program was phased out in 2003, threatening the collapse of the 
industry. The federal government responded quickly by raising solar tariffs. 
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 The wind farm boom led to some construction in less ideal locations often closer to 
residential areas. This led to an increase in public opposition to wind farms on a NIMBY 
rhetoric. In response, the government excluded sites from low wind areas from the FiT. 
 In 2002 the government moved the responsibility of RE from the BMWi to the ‘Federal 
Environment Ministry’. This ministry was headed by a Green’s party member who had 
staffed the department with RE experts and advocates from all parties [96]. 
Although the SPD/Greens lost the 2005 election, the incumbent Christian Democratic Union 
majority government, under Chancellor Angela Merkel, reversed its previous attitude against 
RE.  Since 2005, the German Government has continued to support the uptake of RE through 
numerous targets, plus an ETS. The nation has been praised for its stable and certain policy, 
including a strong long-term outlook known as the Energiewende (Energy Transition).  The 
Energiewende Act was passed by parliament in 2010 and involves the design and 
implementation of a long-term renewables strategy through to 2050. 
6.4.2 Parallels with Australia 
The background information above shows evidence regarding barriers to the uptake of 
renewable energy in Germany in the late 20th century.   Strong opposition was present from 
powerful monopoly utilities with fossil fuel interests, who had a heavy influence on the 
Government, particularly through the BMWi [96, 97]. This closely mirrors the current situation 
in Australia, where fossil fuel interests have successfully campaigned against many RE policies, 
including the repeal of the CPM, and reduction in the RET [100].  We focus here on how 
Germany overcame this opposition to become renowned for its stable renewable energy policy. 
1. Strategic Niche Management. 
Strategic niche management is described as a tool used to support the introduction of often 
radical innovations. It is based on the concept that creating a niche (a protected space where a 
technology can develop) will act as a building block toward broader societal and institutional 
change [101]. In practice, it is more commonly used retrospectively to explain and analyse 
historical case studies of ‘innovation transitions’, as will be done in this circumstance.  
The outcomes of Germany’s early R&D funding illustrate the ideal path of strategic niche 
management. In line with textbook descriptions, the policy was flexible, thereby promoting 
learning, and encouraging a variety of participants - all of which occurred in the sheltered 
environment of ‘research’.  This led to the establishment of a ‘fringe’ body of academic and 
industrial knowledge as well as key advocacy actors.  Subsequently, as ‘cracks’ in the 
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traditional nuclear/coal regime appeared, this niche network was ready and capable of 
expanding into the energy market. The niche market also influenced the process of cumulative 
causation (initially for the wind power industry) as follows: 
i. It led to the creation of a strong advocacy coalition that was able to influence 
government and handle challenges from opposition. 
ii. Strong foundational knowledge allowed for rapid upscaling of turbines and 
construction.  
iii. New supply chains between local component manufacturers and wind turbine suppliers 
were created. Thus expanding not only the reach of economic benefits (and 
consequently the support network), but also reducing barriers of entry [102]. 
Although the success of the German niche market was influenced by a number of unique 
external factors, a similar pathway could potentially be utilised in Australia to manage policy 
instability.  
2. Public Opinion. 
The uptake of renewable energy in Germany grew largely in parallel with increasing 
environmental awareness and public support for climate change. Yet, this was triggered only 
when the public were directly confronted with environmental disasters such as acid rain, minor 
nuclear incidents, and most importantly the Chernobyl disaster. As yet in Australia, there have 
been no such ‘triggers’ to drastically alter public opinion, and climate change denialism is rife. 
Indeed, the average result of weekly opinion polls from 2009-2016 conducted by Essential 
Report [103], found that the percentage of  the population who agreed “climate change is 
happening and is caused by human activity”, fluctuated between 45%-63%. This is 
representative of other polls and statistics presented in literature [104]. Although many of the 
circumstances attributing to Germany’s rise in public support cannot be replicated in Australia 
(e.g. Chernobyl), it does highlight how a shift in public opinion can counter opposition. 
3. The role of conservative farmers. 
Conservative farmers played a vital role in the uptake of RE in Germany. They were key 
members of the coalition which introduced the StrEG, and their support of RE, which divided 
the conservative party, is attributed to the passage of the EEG. In Australia, the National Party, 
self-described as the “the party for regional Australia” [105] also has a large political influence. 
Similar to Germany, the Nationals are considered to be a conservative right wing party. 
Although they hold few seats in Parliament, without their support in forming a coalition, the 
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Liberal Party would not have been able to form government during the last election (even 
including seats won by the combined QLD ‘Liberal National Party’). However, the current 
leader of the National Party is a self-proclaimed climate change sceptic. The party website lists 
no renewable energy policies, and only two environmental policies, targeting the Great Barrier 
Reef and local parks [105].   
The lack of RE policies from the National Party appear contrary to encouraging regional 
communities in Australia to realise the potential benefits of becoming financial stakeholders in 
RE projects.  This fact is highlighted when considering the evidence presented concerning RE 
development in Germany.  Other evidence includes the previously mentioned studies which 
found that the prevalence of ‘wind turbine syndrome’ decreased, as the economic benefits from 
wind farms increased. 
6.5 Policy Analysis: Spain 
Until recent years, Spain ranked alongside Germany as one of the most successful implementers 
of renewable energy. However, due to a variety of complex factors, the nation was particularly 
affected by the 2007-08 Global Financial Crisis, which collapsed the housing market, and 
triggered a recession that still persists today.  As a result, all government support for renewable 
energy was removed in 2012, including some with controversial retrospective features.  This 
initially led to investor uncertainty in Spain, and was followed by subsequent paralysis of the 
industry [13].  As the purpose of this analysis is to provide recommendations for overcoming 
instability, we focus on the diffusion of RE leading up to the 2007-08 recession.  
Spain’s RE boom began in the 1990’s. Since then wind capacity has grown at a steady rate, 
while both CSP, and Solar PV, grew exponentially from 2004 and 2007 respectively.  Key 
drivers of growth cited in literature include a high dependency on energy imports, and Spain’s 
supportive institutional framework which provided stability and certainty [13, 80]. This aspect 
of institutional stability is particularly prominent in literature, with del Rio González [106] 
emphasizing that stability persisted despite legislative changes and change of governments. The 
foundations of this stability is attributed to strong government support and promotion of RE. 
This support was based on anticipated environmental and socio-economic benefits. Particularly 
in regard to job creation, which was at the forefront of Spanish politics in the 1990’s due to 
high unemployment rates [80, 106]. 
From a literature review of Spanish stakeholders, three key groups were identified whose role 
could possibly assist in managing policy instability in Australia. 
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1. Industry groups 
Similar to Germany, the Spanish RE diffusion was supported by a number of influential 
industry organisations. Noteworthy is the Association of Small Renewable Energy Producers 
(APPA).  The APPA were highly networked and involved with multiple social and 
environmental organisations, the media, regional authorities, and regulators, as part of an 
intense lobbying campaign [106]. Both the APPA and the Spanish Wind Energy Association 
were successful lobbyists, with several of their agendas becoming legislation [106]. 
2. Utilities 
Though the traditional Spanish utilities were initially reluctant, their support of RE and 
consequent market entrance was significantly earlier than in other EU nations. This includes 
Germany, where traditional utilities presented the greatest opposition and source of instability. 
The Spanish utilities early market entry has been attributed to Private-Public Partnerships which 
promoted groups of investors, specifically regional governments, manufacturers and utilities to 
pool risk and resources [106]. Private-Public Partnerships have shaped Spain’s RE investment 
profile, with the majority comprising consortia of the above.  
On the contrary, Australian utility investment in RE has been limited to date, though increasing 
in recent years. For example, one of Australia’s largest electricity generators, AGL, has 
committed to approximately 150 MW of Solar PV projects in the last three years, while APA, 
the largest gas infrastructure firm, owns one wind farm, a proposed wind farm development 
site, and has interests in a third wind farm [26, 107]. 
3. Manufacturing Industry 
The Spanish government’s focus on job creation led to the development of a large turbine 
manufacturing industry, which was achieved through mandates requiring the incorporation of 
domestic content. By 2004, 73% of the Spanish installed capacity was manufactured 
domestically, second only to Denmark [108]. Most notable, is the Spanish manufacturer 
Gamesa, who (in spite of the recession) placed 8th globally in terms of supplier market share in 
2014 [109]. There are significant benefits to the establishment of a local manufacturing industry 
including, economic opportunities (job creation, larger tax base), export opportunities and 
equipment cost reductions for domestic developments.   
Research has indicated that stability within the home market plays a significant role in the 
development of these industries. Studies estimate a minimum steady annual demand of 150-
200 MW for at least three years is sufficient to develop a nascent local wind turbine 
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manufacturing industry, and a demand of 500 MW or more, is required in aggressive more 
capable industries [108]. Given this dependence, and considering Australia’s history of policy 
instability, the establishment of a large manufacturing industry in Australia is not a realistic 
management avenue. Indeed, policy instability has led to reductions in the domestic 
manufacturing industry. Yet, the Spanish governments attitude and successful promotion of RE 
which focused on manufacturing, does present a valid management avenue. Indeed, many 
autonomous regions still mandate local content as they “see local wealth in the wind” [108]. 
A similar industry focus on job creation could potentially be beneficial in creating a stable 
environment in Australia. Particularly considering the following circumstances:  
 Unemployment in Australia is currently in the political spotlight with “Jobs and 
Growth” at the core of the national economic plan.  
 There have been recent reductions of around 13,000 employees (-6.9%) in the mining 
sector (constituting Australia’s top 3 export commodities) from 2013/14 to 2014/15 
[110].  
 Ranked across all other sectors, the Australian manufacturing industry suffered the 
highest loss of employment during the five years leading up to November 2015 [111].  
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7 RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
The current tools available to industry for the management of policy instability are presented 
prior to the proposal of five alternate strategies. 
7.1 Current Management Strategies 
There are currently limited risk management tools for policy instability available to 
stakeholders, including investors and industry (developers/project managers/etc.). Literature 
indicates only three common tools, diversification, due diligence and insurance. 
1. Diversification 
Diversification is the key tool used to manage policy risk and can be considered in two contexts. 
Firstly, in terms of geographical diversification whereby a stakeholder develops/invests in 
projects in different nations to reduce risk. Secondly, in terms of finance diversification, 
whereby stakeholders use financial risk transferring mechanisms such as credit derivatives. 
2. Due diligence 
Due diligence is a commonly used tool whereby stakeholders assess historical changes in order 
to identify risk indicators. There is limited literature to assist industry in this respect, and it is 
hoped that this paper will begin to bridge this gap.    
3.  Insurance 
Unfortunately, the latter option is very limited, tending only to cover the geopolitical risks 
associated with unstable governments, e.g. assets destroyed in a civil war. Although some 
private insurers may cover policy changes that are an “expropriate breach of the investor’s 
rights” [112]. A form of FiT insurance is also available for United States equity holders, and 
the World Bank may offer some partial guarantees [112]. However, none of these represent 
realistic comprehensive options for Australian stakeholders. Indeed, Kosub [112] came to the 
conclusions that, “diversification appears to be single risk management tool for policy and 
regulatory risks in general”.  
In addition to the tools discussed above, we propose five alternate methods to managing and 
reducing the negative implications of policy instability, inclusive of the challenges and 
implications involved.  
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7.2 Assessing the Risk 
A basic risk assessment consists of identifying the risks and possible consequences before 
determining their corresponding likelihood and severity and finally a method to mitigate the 
consequences. However, an examination has shown that some, if not all of these steps are often 
neglected, when assessing the risk of policy instability.   
As RE technologies, like wind, become more price competitive with traditional fossil fuels, the 
reliance on policy support for financial viability also decreases. Indeed, many investors will not 
finance projects that are in any way reliant on policy. Yet this makes it easy to presume, that as 
the project is not reliant on policy to be financially viable, policy instability does not need to be 
identified as a valid risk. As demonstrated in the previous sections, this is not a reasonable 
assumption as the consequences of instability are diverse, unpredictable and wide ranging. 
Changes in one sector can easily affect another, and an environment of instability can also 
impact an operational plant. For example, [113] indicated that the University of Queensland did 
not consider the RET impacting their Large-Scale Solar PV facility as the project was not reliant 
on the policy for financial viability, describing the income from the certificates as a ‘bonus’. 
However, when the facilities original Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) expiration coincided 
with the poor market conditions attributed to the RET (See Case Study 3) the University was 
faced with a consequence of policy instability (difficulty renegotiating a favourable PPA). 
Fortunately, the University is officially established as an act of State Parliament and was thus 
able to ‘piggy back’ on the State Governments PPA. However, this favourable outcome is 
unlikely for industry projects.  
Case Study 3 - Power Purchase Agreements 
(PPA) are contracts between an electricity generator and electricity provider, where the 
provider agrees on a set price of power purchase from the generator. These are vital 
agreements for generators as they protect them from market volatility and can determine the 
viability of the project. Surveys conducted by the Department of Industry, Innovation and 
Science [2] found that uncertainty surrounding government renewable energy policies was 
deterring providers from signing long term PPA’s, thus leaving project developers with 
uncertainty surrounding the viability of proceeding projects. PPA’s drive instability in an 
uncertain policy environment, as acknowledged in literature, [8] noted, “it is the dynamic 
of power purchase agreement (PPA) negotiations in the face of PTC [US production tax 
credit] renewal uncertainty that drives investment volatility”. 
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Surveys conducted by the Economist Intelligence Unit [114] found policy and regulatory risk 
to be the highest risk that had actually materialised in a ‘major way’. Yet when asked to rate 
the significance of the risk, respondents considered three to four other risks as having a higher 
significance. Though this isn’t conclusive evidence, it does highlight the disparity between 
those who acknowledged the risk of policy instability and its actual likelihood of occurring.    
Policy instability has been an issue in the Australian RE sector for well over a decade, and was 
frequently mentioned in almost every industry document that was reviewed. Yet from these 
documents, only one developer mentioned taking any steps in managing the risk. Though this 
draws on a representative sample and one cannot conclusively rule out the existence of 
management tools simply on the basis that they are not discussed. The overwhelming number 
of industry comments on the issue, identify the government as both the cause and the only 
solution. This theme is clearly reflected in academic literature which takes a policy-centric view 
on the solution. While it is most definitely true that the simplest solution would be for the 
government to change its behaviour, history has undoubtedly shown that this is unlikely. In 
order to move forward, industry and literature need to adapt to reflect this.   
In light of the above considerations, it is important to stress that actually undertaking a rigorous 
risk assessment can assist in managing and reducing the negative implications of policy 
instability. Certainly, this requires a range of tools, for example, due diligence in identifying 
risks, and industry knowledge to determine risk likelihood and severity. The limited pool of 
mitigation strategies currently available is also restrictive, but without testing and trying 
different strategies, successful solutions cannot be realised.   
7.3 Establishing Institutions 
From the analysis conducted into Spain and Germany, it was evident that the establishment of 
a strong institutional network played a large role in establishing a stable policy environment.  
Australia has a robust higher education and R&D sector, with eight universities placing in the 
Top 100 Times Higher Education 2015 rankings, which uses a 70% Academic Research and 
income component [115]. Indeed, many Australian universities have established some form of 
a collaborative institution based around sustainability/climate change/clean energy, in recent 
years. However, these institutions tend to be very centric. For example, the mission of the 
University of Queensland’s Global Change Institute [116] is “to advance discovery, create 
solutions and influence decision-makers in order to position the University of Queensland  as 
a global leader [emphasis added] in addressing the challenges of a changing world”. While 
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Queensland University of Technology’s Institute for Future Environments, doesn’t mention its 
own advancement as a driver, a glance at institute participants highlights how ‘collaboration’ 
is constrained within the university. Each participation category comprises different types 
students and staff, except “facility users” which includes students and staff not captured in other 
categories and “researchers and clients from outside QUT” [117]. Of the 2661 total participants 
in 2015, only 171 fell into this category. Thus, at the very most, only 6.4% of participants were 
from outside the University [117]. While this centric nature is understandably driven to further 
an institutions standing, it also presents a barrier to network collaboration. In order to establish 
nation-wide networks, the concept of collaboration will need to expand.   
Particularly in Germany these institutional networks were initially driven by strong R&D 
funding and Innovation. Australia was placed 11th by the 2013 Global Innovation Index for 
innovation inputs (when acknowledged in terms of publications and percentage of  GDP spent 
on R&D) and spends around $30 billion annually on R&D [118]. Yet when considering how 
this research funding is converted into innovation and commercial success, Australia ranked 
116th from 142 nations, in addition to being ranked last in OECD nations for collaboration 
[118].   
Unfortunately, policy instability has also affected how institutes collaborate. For example, 
ARENA provides key funding for industry-university collaboration, an institution the 
government attempted to abolish many times. While Industry lobby group the Sustainable 
Energy Association of Australia, ceased trading in 2014 citing, “dramatic changes in 
government policy has made life hard for a developing industry […] All industry needs 
certainty. It’s really difficult for the industry to grow in that environment” [119]. 
Though the challenges exist, Australia has the potential to grow a strong industry network that 
could drive policy stability, in a way similar to Germany and Spain.  
7.4 Improving Industry Transparency 
Stakeholder relations between government and industry can be difficult to navigate, particularly 
in respect to policy instability where the government is both the root cause of the issue, and the 
potential solution. This conflict has significant implications for how the industry reports on 
specific consequences of instability. Indeed, a difficult balance must be met between reporting 
consequences, and appeasing stakeholder relations with the government. Industry-authored 
literature reviewed in compiling this thesis, found the consequences were rarely elaborated on 
in annual reports or on industry website.  
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However, industry submissions to government reviews were often penned in a more open 
manner. For example, Australian wind and solar developer Epuron’s submission to the 2014 
RET review [12] openly criticised numerous government ministers, labelling the “utterly 
offensive” (see Section 4.6.2) comments made by former treasurer Joe Hockey as, 
“inappropriate from the bearer of such office”, before going on to state that, “in a beauty contest 
of power generation wind energy would win hands down”. Though these documents give a 
perhaps more accurate depiction of industry frustration, they also rarely elaborate on specific 
consequences. Indeed, while the overall consequences of policy instability are present in almost 
all industry documentation, project-specific consequences are rarely addressed in publicly 
available information.  
When specific consequences are presented in formal documentation, a high level of 
professionalism is expected. However, this often comes at the cost of accuracy, whereby issues 
may be diluted. For example, a ‘heated argument’ may be presented as a ‘lively discussion’, or 
a serious issue is manipulated into a ‘lesson learnt’. In the case of the University of 
Queensland’s previously mentioned large-scale solar project, disagreements which required 
three years of negotiation with Government owned network distributor Energex, were described 
as requiring “persistence over an extended period” [120]. This diluting factor could potentially 
be reversed via increased industry transparency. For example, as more firms mention 
negotiations with a specific government stakeholder involving ‘lively debates’ requiring 
‘persistence’, the likelier it is to rouse suspicion as a possible risk to be accounted for.  
In respect to the University’s negotiations, Garrone [120] noted these agreements could be 
further refined “particularly if they are made publicly available”. While the Economist 
Intelligence Unit [114]found that the main obstacle to more effective risk management was the 
“restricted availability of industry data”. Considering the above, improving industry 
transparency has a key role to play in managing policy instability. 
7.5 Innovative Investment Strategies 
Though there are various investment diversification options available, little consideration is 
made in respect to innovative investment strategies. One such strategy arises when considering 
how policy instability fundamentally affects investment. Specifically, it represents the 
possibility of reduced and risky financial returns. Thus, to be unaffected by policy instability, 
firms require investors for whom financial returns are not a priority. Which is where they have 
the opportunity to utilise the growing pressure on firms to “adopt green management practices” 
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[121]. One is hard pressed to find a firm that does not release a ‘sustainability report’ or outline 
their environmental role in the community, whether it be supermarket chain Woolworths, 
National Australia Bank or toll operator Transurban. This aspect of corporate responsibility in 
light of the trend to divest from fossil fuels, presents the opportunity for renewable energy firms 
to manage policy instability by approaching investors whose priority is not the security of 
financial return but fulfilling aspects of a perceived corporate responsibility.  
7.6 Shifting Public Opinion 
As seen in Spain and Germany, shifting public opinion was fundamental to achieving policy 
stability. However, this presents a challenge in Australia where the media and the government 
are the primary source of information for the public. The current governments opposition to RE 
has been highlighted in the preceding sections, while media bias in opposition to RE has been 
well documented in literature [122-124]. For example, analysis of ten major Australian 
newspapers found an average 73% of articles gave a negative portrayal of the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism, with the largest bias from the Daily Telegraph with 89% negative coverage [122]. 
Shifting public opinion is a complex task that needs to consider several environmental factors 
and variables. Thus, a simplified approach which considers only how public opinion was shifted 
in Germany and Spain is considered. 
1. Identify a target. 
It is arguably an impossible task to shift the public opinion of an entire nation, thus it is vital to 
identify a segment of the public where a shift would have the most impact. In this respect we 
draw on the previous comparison made with Germany, where conservative members from 
regional areas had the largest impact. Indeed, their support of renewable energy, divided the 
conservative party, and thus the key opposition.  
2. Identify why it should shift. 
In both Spain and Germany, public opinion shifted toward renewable energy because it was 
perceived as a solution to public concerns.  In Germany this was largely due to rising 
environmental concerns, while in Spain it was seen as the answer to low employment. In order 
to shift the Australian public in support of renewable energy, the industry needs to clearly 
identify public concerns and how RE can address these. As previously discussed, the current 
circumstances seem to indicate higher employment concerns, than environmental, but this 
requires a more detailed examination.  
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8 CONCLUSION 
Concluding comments are considered for each of the three parts comprising the thesis. 
8.1 Part One 
Key conclusions from Sections 2 and 3 follow: 
 Policy Instability has been influenced by the political structure due to frequent change 
in prime minister, and the different levels of government which give rise to multi-
jurisdictional issues. 
 Collaboration between State leaders via the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) has played a significant role in reducing multi-jurisdictional issues. 
 The lacking ‘national’ component of the Australian electricity grid gives rise to a 
complex regulatory system and conflicting state interests (which are not always of 
benefit to the RE sector). 
 The RE sector is impacted by both direct policies which target the development of the 
sector itself, and indirect policies which target varying aspects of climate change. 
 Five key sources contributing to an environment of policy instability were identified: 
o Excessive Policy Change – including administrative changes, policy 
amendment/enactment/abolishment, and the duration of time over which a 
change occurs. 
o Policy Design 
o Jurisdictional Interactions 
o Policy Reviews 
o The governments long term strategic outlook 
8.2 Part Two 
Table 8.1 summarises several key triggers of policy instability and possible management/due 
diligence responses for industry, as discussed in Section 4.   
Table 8.1: Summary of Instability Triggers and Due Diligence in Australia 
Trigger Management 
Unambitious federal renewable 
energy targets can trigger the 
introduction of state targets, and 
multi-jurisdictional issues. 
Should assess: 
Risks associated with individual legislation. 
Risks associated with potential interactions. 
A specified policy end-date, with 
no plans thereafter, may trigger 
detrimental investment cycles. 
Should pre-empt ebb in investment associated with policy 
end date. Particularly if it appears boom-and-bust cycle is 
evident. 
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Trigger Management 
A generous FiT can trigger 
revisions. 
Consider, the snowball effects of an overly generous policy. 
Peruse the engineering modelling conducted and identify any 
unreasonable assumptions, that may have led to an overly 
generous design. 
Policy design issues of a ‘One size 
fits all’ policy that covers all types 
and scales of RE. 
Should identify, and monitor growth and changes in other 
sectors, included in the policy, and identify how this may 
affect current operations/projects. 
Legislative change can be justified 
on misconstrued ‘policy intent’. 
Consider not only what is prescribed in legislation, but how 
the government refers/describes to the policy in public.  
Non bi-partisan support can lead to 
an extended ‘duration of change’. 
Prepare and expect an extended period of debate and 
negotiations when bi-partisan support is not present. Note 
also that investment will likely be affected. 
Reviews can be the key driver of 
policy instability. 
The degree of instability will likely increase as the scope of 
the review increases. A review in itself will create instability 
regardless of whether it gives rise to change.  
Early program announcement by a 
government unprepared to 
implement a policy, can trigger a 
boom-and-bust cycle. 
After a policy is announced, consult with the government 
how prepared they are for implementation. Note at the time 
of announcement if specific operational details are provided, 
or if the description appears vague and unfinalised.  
The detailed analysis showed that the extent of policy instability was often driven by the 
perception of investors. As a result, industry is often affected by the consequences of instability, 
without a specific change occurring. Literature to date has been focused on legislation, and even 
investor surveys generally only ask questions pertaining to specific policy instruments. Thus, it 
is a key area for additional research, to further examine investor responses to policy aspects 
such as government announcements, policy intent and the policy review processes. Given that 
the greatest consequence of instability is reduced investment, it is crucial that investor responses 
are well understood. Policy instability was also shown to trigger boom-and-bust cycles. This 
had varying consequences from bankruptcy, to periods of over- and undersupply as well as 
unexpected issues such as reducing the governments capacity to ensure compliance with 
industry standards. 
This investigation was limited to considering policy instability only, due to the thesis objectives 
and the significant scope required to analyse both the stable and unstable aspects. Thus, an area 
for further research arises, whereby a contrasting analysis of both aspects could be conducted.  
8.3 Part Three 
Measuring a nations resource utilisation, proved to be a complex task with extensive limitations. 
Further research is required in this area to improve measurement accuracies and methods to 
account for the different geographic/social/institutional/etc. aspects between nations. 
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Fortunately, this investigation did not necessitate a high degree of accuracy, as its purpose was 
merely to identify nations suitable for possible research.  
Germany and Spain were identified as demonstrating a high degree of resource utilisation, and 
their long-term policy environment found the establishment of strong institutional networks to 
be a key strategy in managing policy instability. Also, a strong manufacturing industry in Spain 
and environmental awareness in Germany, also contributed to stronger social acceptance. 
A literature review revealed current risk management tools for instability were limited to 
diversification, due diligence and insurance. Five other key strategies were identified including: 
 Completing a full risk-assessment which accounts for the wide ranging impacts of 
policy instability, including from indirect policy and multi-targeted policy objectives. 
 Establishing strong institutional networks to promote the uptake of renewable energy. 
 Improving industry transparency to allow collaboration and greater awareness of project 
specific consequences of policy instability. 
 Utilising innovative investment strategies, which focus on identifying investors less 
sensitive to policy instability.  
 Shifting public opinion by clearly identifying a target demographic. 
8.4 Overall  
As per the aims of this investigation, the aspects of policy instability causing detriment to the 
renewables industry were clearly identified and their extent analysed. However, this was not 
without limitations. Given the wide scope of complex interactions, it is recommended that in 
future a similar investigation be presented as collection of papers. Managements strategies were 
also proposed, though these were predominantly presented in light of the resultant case studies 
from Spain and Germany. In future, with increased industry transparency and literature 
investigating this issue, these strategies may be presented in light of a wider range of 
considerations.  
It is evident that the negative consequences of policy instability are complex and far reaching. 
Significant research in this area is still required, particularly to develop methods for industry to 
manage the issue. Though no clear solution is in sight, this paper has clearly validated the merit 
of considering a ‘government policy problem’ from an industry perspective. Moving forward, 
it is hoped this will lead to a solution driven approach that can be implemented by the industry 
that requires it.  
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